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James J Hiopard, Sr. *
I. INVESTIGATION TO INDICTMENT
A. Investigation, Search, Seizure, and Arrest
Temporary Investigative Detention. It is settled that even without proba-
ble cause a police officer may briefly stop a suspicious individual, whether
a pedestrian or an occupant of a car, in order to determine his identity or
to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more informa-
tion.' In Armstrong v. State2 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals set
down the test for allowing such brief stops without probable cause:
There must be a reasonable suspicion by the law enforcement of-
ficer that some activity out of the ordinary is or had occurred, some
suggestion to connect the detained person with the unusual activity,
and some indication that the activity is related to crime.3
Three recent cases clarify this test. In Shaffer v. State4 a police officer
observed defendant driving his cab five to ten miles per hour at 3:00 a.m.
in a commercial area where all businesses were closed. It was not a high
crime area and defendant was not violating any traffice laws or driving
erratically. The court held the stop illegal, observing that "even in the
absence of bad faith, detention based 'on a mere hunch' is illegal ....
Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal
activity, a detention based on these events is unlawful."
The defendant in Jones v. State6 was a white male walking with two
black men in a black neighborhood near the noon hour. Defendant
looked at a police car as it approached and then placed his hand in his
pocket. Although there was no indication that the incident took place in a
high crime area, the police officer stopped the defendant for questioning.
The court held the original detention illegal since there was no basis for
the officer to believe that defendant was engaging in any criminal activity.
In comparison, Amorella v. State7 upheld the investigative detention of
the defendants under the following circumstances. Defendants' car was
* B.S., B.B.A., University of Texas at Austin; J.D., University of Houston; LL.M.,
New York University. Professor of Law, University of Houston. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the assistance of Susan Tate, law student, University of Houston.
1. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. 550 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
3. Id at 31.
4. 562 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
5. Id at 855.
6. 567 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
7. 554 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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parked with the engine running in front of a closed store at 1:30 a.m. in a
high crime area where all other businesses were closed. Two defendants
were in the car and one defendant was standing in back of the car with the
trunk open. When the police car passed, the outside man closed the trunk,
got into the car and started away. Amorella upheld the detention because
there was activity out of the ordinary and some indication that the activity
was related to crime.
Temporary Seizure of Nonarrested Traffic Offender. Pennsylvania v.
Mimms' extended the less than probable cause temporary detention con-
cept of Terry v. Ohio9 to all nonarrested traffic offenders stopped for the
issuance of a traffic summons. A police officer stopped defendant Mimms
to issue a ticket for driving with an expired license plate. As a routine
precautionary measure the officer ordered Mimms out of his car. When
Mimms emerged from his car, the officer noticed a bulge in his jacket,
frisked him, and discovered a revolver. Defendant was convicted for car-
rying a concealed deadly weapon and possessing a firearm without a li-
cense.
The Court held that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for
a traffic violation, the police officer may order the driver out of the vehicle
without violating the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, asserted that such a
general rule appeared to abandon the central teaching of the Court's
fourth amendment jurisprudence "which has ordinarily required individu-
alized inquiry into the particular facts justifying every police intrusion."'"
The Justice also feared that the rule would eventually be expanded to al-
low an automatic safety search of every driver and passenger legitimately
stopped no matter how trivial the offense."
Searches by Private Citizens. It has long been recognized that the fourth
amendment is not applicable to searches by private citizens who are
neither law enforcement officers nor acting as agents for a law enforcement
officer, and thus does not require the exclusion of evidence so obtained.' 2
In Moore v. State'3 the State unsuccessfully sought to apply this rule to a
search by an off-duty police officer. Moore was convicted for possession of
marijuana after an off-duty police officer searched the defendant's parked
van without probable cause. The Court rejected the State's contention that
the officer was a private citizen at the time of the search, pointing out that
a police officer's off-duty status is not a limitation upon the discharge of
police authority since an officer, for many purposes, is on duty twenty-four
hours a day.
8. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curian).
9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. Id at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Id at 121-23.
12. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
13. 562 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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. The rule that the fourth amendment proscribes only governmental ac-
tion, however, was successfully used in Bodde v. State, 4 in which evidence
obtained by defendant's landlady from his apartment was held not subject
to fourth amendment exclusion. The court held that although article 38.23
of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "[n]o evidence obtained
by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitu-
tion or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the
United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the ac-
cused on the trial of any criminal case,"' 5 it did not render inadmissible
the items seized by the defendant's landlady since she was rightfully on the
premises. 16
An arguable implication of the decision is that the result would have
been otherwise if the landlady had not been rightfully on the premises.
Warrantless Exterior Examination of an Impounded Vehicle. The United
States Supreme Court held in Cardwell v. Lewis 7 that when probable
cause exists a warrantless examination of the exterior of an impounded
vehicle is reasonable and invades no right of privacy. In Cardwell defend-
ant's car had been impounded by the police and paint scrapings were
taken from the car during an external examination. Under very similar
circumstances the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a warrantless,
probable cause examination in Easley v. State. 8 It should be noted, how-
ever, that neither Cardwell nor Easley asserts that examination of an im-
pounded vehicle's exterior is immune from fourth amendment
proscription. In both cases there were findings of probable cause and the
basic problem was the lack of a search warrant. The plurality in Cardwell,
however, found the possibility of the car's removal sufficiently exigent to
excuse the lack of a warrant, whereas the Easley court did not address this
problem. The plurality opinion in Cardwell is questionable support for an
even more questionable result in Easley.
Warrantless Search- "Murder Scene" Exception. The Supreme Court of
Arizona held that "a reasonable, warrantless search of the scene of a homi-
cide. . . does not violate the Fourth Amendment. . . [if it begins] within
a reasonable period following the time when the officials first learn of the
murder (or potential murder)."' In Mincey v. Arizona2 0 the United States
Supreme Court unanimously rejected this asserted exigency justification
for a warrantless search. Mincey reiterates the basic rule that warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. The Court
14. 568 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
15. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1966) (emphasis added).
16. 568 S.W.2d at 353.
17. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
18. 564 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
19. Mincey v. Arizona, 115 Ariz. 472, 482, 566 P.2d 273, 283 (1977), quotedin Mincey v.
Arizona, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 298 (1978).
20. Mincey v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978).
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explained that the seriousness of the offense under investigation did not in
and of itself create an exigent circumstance of the kind that would justify a
warrantless search; that is, there was no emergency threatening life or
limb, nor was there any indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed,
or removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant.
Search Warrant Affidavit-Truthfulness Challenge. The long established
Texas prohibition against going behind the face of a search warrant affida-
vit2 ' has been overturned by the Supreme Court. Franks v. Delaware22
held that if a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that an
affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, includes a false statement in his affidavit for a search warrant, the
fourth amendment requires a hearing if the alleged false statement was
necessary to the finding of probable cause. The search warrant must be
voided and the fruits of the search suppressed if the allegations are proven
by a preponderance of the evidence. In order to secure an evidentiary
hearing on a veracity challenge the defendant's attack must be more than
conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-
examine. Affidavits, or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of wit-
nesses, should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained.23
The difficult question raised by Franks, which the Court specifically de-
clined to decide, is "whether a reviewing court must ever require the reve-
lation of the identity of an informant once a substantial preliminary
showing of falsity has been made."2 4 The Court hints at the answer to its
own question by reference to its decision in McCray v. Illinois,25 which
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not re-
quire the State to expose an informant's identity upon a defendant's mere
demand when there was ample evidence in the probable cause hearing to
show that the informant was reliable and his information credible.
The holding in Franks may evolve into a requirement that an unidenti-
fied informant be brought forward by the State at a pretrial evidentiary
hearing upon the defendant's adequate preliminary allegation of deliber-
ate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth. As Justice Douglas
stated in the McCray dissent: "It is not unknown for the arresting officer to
misrepresent his connection with the informer, his knowledge of the in-
former's reliability, or the information allegedly obtained from the in-
former."26
In Texas the identification of previously unidentified informants may be
required to be revealed only at the time of trial and then only if the in-
former either participated in the offense, was present at the time of the
offense or arrest, or was otherwise shown to be a material witness to the
21. See, e.g., Oubre v. State, 542 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
22. 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).
23. Id at 2685, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 682.
24. Id at 2684, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 681.
25. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
26. Id at 316 n.2.
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transaction or as to whether defendant knowingly committed the act
charged.27 Perhaps Franks has opened the door to pretrial revelation of
the informer and to possible suppression of evidence whenever the defend-
ant is able to mount a substantial veracity challenge to a search warrant
affidavit based on information from an allegedly reliable unidentified in-
formant.
Standing. In Texas a defendant who seeks to challenge the legitimacy of
a search and seizure as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence has the
burden of alleging standing: (1) by reason of his proprietary or possessory
interest in the thing searched or seized; (2) his legitimate presence on the
premises searched; or (3) his having been charged with an offense, an es-
sential element of which is possession of the seized evidence. The last ba-
sis is commonly referred to as the "automatic standing" doctrine.
Prior to Sullivan v. State,28 decided in May 1977, the State was required
to contest the defendant's standing contentions under items (1) or (2)
above in the trial court or else be precluded from raising the issue on ap-
peal.29 In Sullivan a majority of the court of criminal appeals sitting en
banc held that the "State does not have the burden of listing or verbalizing
in the trial court every possible basis for holding a search legal or else
waive that basis for urging on appeal the validity of the search."3 ° The
dissent in Sullivan urged that unless the State is required to raise the issue
of standing at trial, the defendant is denied the opportunity to present evi-
dence on the issue, and is thus denied due process of law.3' In the future,
defendants asserting standing under items (1) or (2) above should always
offer as complete proof of standing as they possibly can even though the
State makes no move to contest standing at the trial level.
The defendant also contended in Sullivan that the State was precluded
from asserting that he possessed and used a gun to murder the victim, and
yet lacked sufficient possession to confer standing to challenge the search
of the car that produced the gun. The court responded that the State was
not taking a contradictory position barred by law, in view of the State's
assertion that the defendant had disavowed any proprietary or possessory
interest in the searched car before the search was made. In such an event
the State may argue without contradiction that the defendant had posses-
sion of the murder weapon at one time for purposes of conviction, but that
at a later time, because of abandonment, defendant lacked the possessory
interest in the car necessary to confer standing to object to the search of the
car and seizure of the murder weapon.
Search Warrant-Blood. The taking of a blood sample from a defendant
27. Bernard v. State, 566 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
28. 564 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (en banc).
29. See, e.g., Maldonado v. State, 528 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
30. 564 S.W.2d at 704.
31. Id at 706.
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is a search and seizure within the meaning of both the fourth amendment32
and article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. 3 Effective May 25, 1977,
article 18.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to
permit the issuance of a search warrant for "property or items. . . consti-
tuting evidence of an offense or contributin, evidence tending to show that
a particular person committed an offense." I Prior to the addition of this
language, a majority of the court of criminal appeals in Escamilla v State3 5
stated that even a properly prepared search warrant issued upon a showing
of probable cause would be invalid because blood was not one of the items
for which a search warrant could issue under article 18.02.
It remains to be seen whether blood will be construed to be "property"
or an "item" within the meaning of amended article 18.02(10). It is clear
that even if the amended statute is construed to permit search and seizure
of a defendant's blood, a properly obtained search warrant issued upon a
showing of probable cause would nevertheless be required because a per-
son's blood type remains constant throughout his lifetime so there can be
no valid claim of exigency.36 Neither can there be a valid warrantless
search for blood incident to a lawful arrest since it is not unlawful to pos-
sess blood, nor would the possession of blood endanger the arresting of-
ficer.37 The only exception to the warrant requirement as a prerequisite to
a search for blood would be where positive and unequivocal consent was
proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been freely and voluntar-
ily given, and this burden cannot be discharged by showing mere acquies-
cence to a claim of lawful authority.38
Arrest Warrant Execution--Knock or No Knock. "Knock and announce"
statutes, requiring police officers to announce their identity and purpose
before making a forcible entry to arrest or search, have been enacted in
most states39 and by the federal government.' Texas has such statutes,
4
'
but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized once again in Jones
v. State42 that Texas might as well have an explicit "no knock" statute.
In Jones the officers admitted that they neither knocked nor announced
their identity before making a forcible entry into defendant's dwelling to
32. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
33. Smith v. State, 557 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Escamilla v. State, 556
S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
34. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02(10) (Vernon 1977).
35. 556 S.W.2d at 799.
36. Smith v. State, 557 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). This assertion in no way
conflicts with the holding in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which a war-
rantless taking of blood was upheld because of the threatened destruction of evidence,
namely, the momentary presence of alcohol in the bloodstream of a defendant accused of
driving while intoxicated.
37. 557 S.W.2d at 302.
38. 556 S.W.2d at 799.
39. For a list of these statutes, see Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful
Entry. Miller Y. United States and Ker Y. Cali/brnia, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1964).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976).
41. TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN. arts. 15.25, .26, 18.06(b) (Vernon 1977).
42. 568 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Grim. App. 1978) (en banc).
[Vol. 33
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
make an arrest. Defendant urged that evidence seized in conjunction with
the arrest should have been suppressed in light of the officers' acknowl-
edged violations of article 15.25 and 15.26 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. The court summarily rejected this contention, reasoning that
in earlier decisions involving the same statutory requirements as applied to
searches, the court had not allowed an officer's failure to knock and an-
nounce to render the ensuing searches illegal.43 Thus, the court could per-
ceive no reason why noncompliance with the same requirements as
applied to arrests should render the arrest illegal. Since the court's conclu-
sion of legality is just as summary in the earlier decisions cited, it appears
that the court has in effect nullified articles 15.25, 15.26, and 18.06(b) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
Historically, knock and announce statutes are codifications of early
common law principles respecting protection of privacy, mitigation of vio-
lence, and the preservation of property." These are obviously the legisla-
tive goals of the Texas statutes, and there is no practical way to enforce
these public policy goals other than to suppress evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the statutory requirements.45 Given this public policy foundation,
it is for the legislature to decide whether the goals are to be discarded.
Validity of Search and Seizure-Jury Charge. Where an issue of fact is
raised concerning the validity of a search and thus the admissibility of
evidence obtained by the search, the defendant has a right under article
38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure46 to have the jury charged con-
cerning such issue. Jordan P. State47 reminds us that it is reversible error
for the trial court to refuse such a requested charge.
Defendant Jordon was convicted for unlawfully carrying a gun on a
premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages. At trial the officer who de-
tained and searched defendant asserted the validity of the detention and
search by reason of information allegedly given to him by defendant's for-
mer girlfriend. The former girlfriend took the stand for defendant and
denied giving any information to the officer. This conflicting testimony
raised an article 38.23 issue as to the validity of defendant's detention and
search, and thus as to the admissibility of the gun found on defendant. As
43. Barnes v. State, 504 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Smith v. State, 491 S.W.2d
924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
44. Annot., 21 A.L.R. FED. 820, 823 (1974).
45. See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 217 § 3 (1976).
46. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1966) provides:
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any pro-
visions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution
or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against
the accused on the trial of any criminal case.
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall
be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence
was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such
event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.
47. 562 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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the terms of article 38.23 are clearly mandatory, the trial court's refusal of
the requested charge was held to be reversible error.
B. Confessions and Admissions
Custodial Silence Used to Impeach. A prosecutor may use post-arrest
statements for impeachment purposes even though they are inadmissible
as evidence of guilt because of Miranda defects.48 Consider, however, the
use of silence for impeachment purposes, both where the silence precedes
and succeeds Miranda warnings. Doyle v. Ohio49 established that the use
of a defendant's silence at the time of arrest for impeachment purposes
after receiving proper Miranda warnings violates the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.5 0 Although the Doyle court conceded that
there are no express assurances in Miranda warnings that silence will not
carry a penalty, such assurance is implicitly given to any person receiving
the warning.5 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Henderson52 established a nonconstitutional rule for custodial but
pre-Miranda warning silence that may prove definitive: the custodial si-
lence of a defendant, prior to having received Miranda warnings, cannot
be used to impeach unless such silence is totally inconsistent with the de-
fendant's innocence and his exculpatory statements given at the trial. The
court further explained that it would be the rare and exceptional case
where comment on silence would be permissible and emphasized that
there must be total inconsistency before impeachment can take place. If
any rational explanation for the defendant's silence exists, then any refer-
ence to silence carries with it an intolerably prejudicial impact and will
constitute reversible error, even absent any objection by the defendant. 3
A brief consideration of the facts in Henderson will clarify application of
the rule. The defendant, a federal prisoner, was properly subjected to a
custodial search by prison guards, which led to the discovery of marijuana
on his person. The guards took defendant to a locked interrogation room
where he remained until an FBI agent arrived to interrogate him. From
the time of the search until the FBI agent came, the guards neither ques-
tioned defendant nor gave him Miranda warnings, and defendant re-
mained silent. After receiving the Miranda warnings, defendant told the
FBI agent that he had found the marijuana while performing his janitorial
duties shortly before being stopped and searched, and that he had re-
48. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
49. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
50. The Court distinguished and excluded from application of the rule the situation in
which a prosecutor uses the fact of post-arrest silence to contradict a defendant who testifies
to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version on
arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpa-
tory story, but rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to his behavior following
arrest. Id at 619 n.ll.
51. Id at 618.
52. 565 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1978).
53. Id at 905.
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mained silent because he feared being called a "snitch" by other prisoners.
This exculpatory explanation was asserted by defendant at trial. During
closing argument, the prosecutor commented on defendant's pre-Miranda
warning silence, without objection by defendant's attorney. Defendant
was convicted and on appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for
the reasons discussed above. Under the Henderson rule the result would
have been the same even if defendant elected to remain silent in response
to the interrogation of the FBI agent. The other federal circuits and the
various states would do well to adopt the approach taken by the Fifth Cir-
cuit.
The Right to Silence. In GrifJn v. California54 the Supreme Court held
that the fifth amendment gives a defendant the absolute right to remain
silent in a trial and forbids either comment by the prosecution on the de-
fendant's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence
of guilt. The Court, however, expressly reserved decision on whether a de-
fendant can require the trial judge to instruct the jury that defendant's
silence must be disregarded." In the recent case of Lakeside v Oregon56
the Court once again left that question unanswered, but at the same time
concluded that the giving of such an instruction over the defendant's ob-
jection does not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. While rejecting the
defendant's contention that it was a violation of the fifth amendment for a
trial judge to draw the jury's attention in any way to the defendant's fail-
ure to testify unless the defendant acquiesces, the Court conceded that "[ilt
may be wise for a trial judge not to give such a cautionary instruction over
defendant's objection. And each State is, of course, free to forbid its trial
judges from doing so as a matter of state law."57
Lakeside effects no change in Texas law. In Rogers v. State58 the court
of criminal appeals affirmed earlier cases holding that it was not reversible
error to give such an instruction, but once again admonished trial judges to
omit the instruction when requested by the defense to do so. The court in
Rogers spoke of the importance of a trial court's being able to instruct the
jury in the language of article 38.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, which states that "the failure of any defendant to . . .testify shall
not be taken as a circumstance against him. . . ." In view of this justifica-
tion for not allowing a defendant to waive such an instruction, it is indeed
strange to find that in Texas a defendant may not insist on that same in-
struction. 9
Justice Stevens, in his Lakeside dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, ar-
gued that since a defendant may waive his fifth amendment right to silence
54. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
55. Id. at 615.
56. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
57. Id at 340.
58. 486 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
59. Galan v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 521, 301 S.W.2d 141 (1957).
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without leave of the trial court, it follows that a defendant should also be
able to waive, without leave of the trial court, any lesser right he might
have to an instruction regarding said right to silence.6" The logic of this
argument is compelling.
Confession Voluntariness-State's Evidence Alone Does Not Raise Is-
sue. The defendant in Brooks v. State6 moved to suppress his confession
as involuntary, asserting that he was not physically capable of making the
confession at the time it was made. A Jackson v. Denno62 hearing was had
during the trial and the State, in anticipation of an attack on the confes-
sion, put on evidence of voluntariness. It turned out, however, that the
defendant presented no evidence to indicate that the confession was not
voluntary.
At the conclusion of the trial, defendant requested a jury instruction on
voluntariness pursuant to article 38.22(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure,63 which provides that "[w]hen the issue is raised by the evi-
dence, the trial judge shall appropriately instruct the jury, generally, on the
law pertaining to such statement or confession." The trial court refused to
give the instruction and defendant was convicted. He appealed, asserting
that the trial court erred in not giving a jury instruction on voluntariness,
and that the appeal should have been abated per Hester v. State' until the
trial court made a specific detailed fact finding as to whether defendant
was physically capable of making a confession at the time he was interro-
gated by the police.
The court of criminal appeals ruled: (1) evidence presented by the State
in anticipation of an attack on the voluntariness of a confession does not
put voluntariness in issue; only when some evidence is presented that a
confession is not voluntary is the matter put in issue;65 and (2) even though
the trial court should have made a specific fact finding regarding physical
ability, there was no reason to abate since defendant never actually
mounted a challenge of the voluntariness and admissibility of the confes-
66sion.
C. Lineups and Pretrial Identification
According to Kirby v. Illinois67 the sixth amendment right to counsel
attaches to corporeal identification conducted at or after the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings.68 This principle was reaffirmed in
60. 435 U.s. at 347-48.
61. 567 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
62. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
63. The language of art. 38.22(c) is now found virtually unchanged at TEx. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 7 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-78).
64. 535 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
65. 567 S.W.2d at 3.
66. Id at 4.
67. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
68. Id at 688.
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Moore v. Illinois.69 In Moore the United States Supreme Court held that a
rape victim's identification of defendant during his uncounseled prelimi-
nary hearing, after the victim signed a complaint, was an uncounseled cor-
poreal identification conducted at or after the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings and violated the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. Further, the Court reemphasized that the right to
counsel applies to one-on-one identification proceedings as well as to line-
ups.
70
During the survey period the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied
the Kirby rule in a questionable manner. In Wyatt v. State71 the defendant
was arrested on January 29, 1975, and was taken on January 30, at 8:35
a.m., before a magistrate who, pursuant to article 15.17 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure,7 2 informed him that he was charged with the of-
fense of aggravated robbery. 3 Defendant signed a printed acknowledg-
ment form. At 1:40 p.m. on the same day defendant was placed in a lineup
without waiver of his right to an attorney and identified by the robbery
victim. On January 31 at 11:09 a.m. a formal complaint was filed charging
defendant with aggravated robbery, and he was subsequently convicted of
the crime.
On appeal defendant contended that the trial court erred in failing to
suppress the victim's identification at trial and all evidence of the lineup
because the lineup had been held after defendant had been charged with
aggravated robbery and he should have been given the opportunity to
have counsel present pursuant to Kirby. The court of criminal appeals
upheld the conviction, asserting that informing a defendant of the accusa-
tion against him does not constitute the initiation of adversary criminal
procedures. Consequently, the court concluded that "the lineup was inves-
tigatory in nature and not accusatory. It was conducted prior to any ar-
raignment, indictment, or formal charges being brought against
[defendant] and. . .[he] was not entitled to counsel as a matter of abso-
lute right."74
It is difficult to understand how the Wyatt lineup could have been inves-
tigatory in nature and not accusatory when it did not take place until de-
fendant had been under arrest for the better part of twenty-four hours, and
after a magistrate of the State of Texas had informed him, both orally and
in writing, that he was charged with the offense of aggravated robbery.75
The court's reasoning becomes even more difficult to follow upon consid-
ering that the magistrate was carrying out the duty imposed on him by
article 15.17 to "inform in clear language the person arrested of the accusa-
69. 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
70. Id at 229.
71. 566 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
72. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17 (Vernon 1977).
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tion against him and of any affidavit filed therewith."76
It is also hard to accept the court's description of the lineup as "investi-
gatory" when under Texas law the only legal temporary investigative de-
tention without probable cause is the brief stop of a suspicious individual
in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentar-
ily while obtaining more information.77 Thus, under the facts of Wyatt
and under applicable Texas law, it must be assumed that defendant had
been arrested with probable cause to believe he had committed aggravated
robbery. After all, this is the charge with which defendant was accused,
according to the magistrate's warning given on the second day of the de-
fendant's arrest. How then could a lineup subsequent to all of this be
merely investigatory in nature?
As iterated in Kirby and reiterated in Moore, the point that marks the
commencement of a criminal prosecution to which alone the explicit guar-
antees of the sixth amendment are applicable is the point at which a
defendant finds "himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized
society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural
criminal law."7" That point would appear to have been reached in Wyatt.
II. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
A. Indictments and Informations
Defective Indictments and Informations- Void or Voidable. The court of
criminal appeals continues its struggle with the excessive complexity and
confusion in the law of indictments and informations,79 but not always
successfully. Hereafter "indictment" is used as including "information."
In an indictment "[t]he offense must be set forth in plain and intelligible
words."8 Also, whenever it becomes necessary to describe property in an
indictment, the property must be described with as much specificity as pos-
sible.8 ' Over the years the court has handed down conflicting opinions as
to when a deficiency in the allegation of an offense would be regarded as
substantively objectionable so as to render the defective indictment void,
or objectionable only as to form so as to render the defective indictment
merely voidable. The distinction is extremely important because a void
indictment is ineffective to invoke the court's jurisdiction,82 and may be
76. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17 (Vernon 1977) (emphasis added).
77. Armstrong v. State, 550 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
78. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 228 (1977)(quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
689 (1972)).
79. Foreman & Jones, Indictments Under the New Texas Penal Code, 15 Hous. L. REV.
1(1977).
80. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 21.02(7) (indictment), 21.21(7) (information)
(Vernon 1966).
81. Id art. 21.09 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
82. A prerequisite to the exercise of power by a court to hear and determine a criminal
case is a legal invocation of the jurisdiction of that court. In criminal trials the court's juris-
diction to act can only be invoked by a valid written pleading. Where the State's pleading
(indictment or information) is found to be void, the court's jurisdiction is never legally in-
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attacked at any time. 83 In comparison, if the indictment is merely voida-
ble, the defect will be treated as waived and denied appellate consideration
if a defendant fails to urge it before trial by timely motion to quash.
84
In American Plant Food Corp. v. State85 the court laid down a new, more
lenient rule for measuring the sufficiency of an indictment to advise a de-
fendant with reasonable certainty of the accusation he was being called
upon to meet: unless the deficiency in the description of the offense alleged
to have been committed by the defendant is of such a degree as to utterly
fail to charge that an offense against the law has been committed by the
defendant, it is objectionable only as to form and not as to substance.86
Under the American Plant Food rule an indictment cannot be fundamen-
tally defective and thus void unless the defect in the description of the
offense is "of such a degree as to charge no offense against the law." 87
Conversely, under the new rule, a defendant's complaint that an indict-
ment fails to give adequate notice of precisely what the defendant is
charged with and fails to allege sufficient facts to bar a subsequent convic-
tion is an objection as to form and must be properly raised in a pretrial
motion to quash. Absent a motion to quash, the defect in the indictment is
waived and will not thereafter be considered. In other words, such a defect
only renders the indictment voidable, not void. The court explained this
aspect of the rule by pointing out that prior to trial the defendant may raise
such an objection if he wishes, "but if he goes to trial without raising any
such objection, he may not . . . [raise it] for the first time thereafter, since
it must be presumed he has found the charge sufficient to his own satisfac-
tion. He may not wait to see whether the jury will acquit him, and then,
upon an adverse verdict, claim for the first time that he had no notice or
that the charge will not bar a subsequent conviction." 88
During the survey period the court had occasion to make specific appli-
cation of the American Plant Food rule in three cases, two of them en banc
decisions. The results do not appear to be consistent. In Rhodes v. State89
defendant was convicted and given probation for theft of wall paneling
valued at over fifty dollars. Defendant's probation was subsequently re-
voked and on appeal of that revocation, the sufficiency of the indictment
was considered for the first time. Applying the American Plant Food rule,
the court concluded that the deficiency of the property description was not
of such a degree as to utterly fail to charge that an offense against the law
had been committed by the defendant. To the contrary, said the court, this
was a defect in form, as the indictment failed to give sufficient description
of the property allegedly stolen. The defendant, however, waived the in-
yoked, and the court's power to act is as absent as if it did not exist. Exparte Cannon, 546
S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (Odom, J., concurring).
83. American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
84. Id at 603-04.
85. 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
86. Id at 603.
87. Id at 602.
88. Id at 604.
89. 560 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
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sufficiency when he failed to make a timely motion to quash. In the lan-
guage of American Plant Food, "if he goes to trial without raising any such
objection, he may not urge them [sic] for the first time thereafter, since it
must be presumed he has found the charge sufficient to his own satisfac-
tion. " "
Two months later in Expare Canady,9 1 a majority of the court, again
sitting en banc, found an armed robbery indictment, which charged the
defendant with having taken "corporeal personal property" from the vic-
tim, to be fundamentally defective and therefore void. The court reasoned
that the property description was so defective as to be no description at all
and, under the American Plant Food rule, rendered the indictment defec-
tive to such a degree that it charged no offense, and was void. Conse-
quently, the defendant's habeas corpus attack on the indictment eight
years after it was issued was successful, and the indictment was dismissed.
The dissent of Judge Vollers, joined by Judge Douglas, asserts that the
majority opinion is in direct contravention of the rule laid down in Ameri-
can Plant Food. The point of the dissent is well taken. In the dissent's
view the indictment was only voidable, not void, because it did not utterly
fail to charge that an offense against the law was committed by defendant.
To the contrary, the charge of taking "corporeal personal property" alleges
the necessary element in question, that is, a taking of property.92
The dissent agreed that the property description in the indictment was
clearly insufficient,93 but pointed out that, under the teachings of American
Plant Food, the indictment was only voidable and as such was subject to a
pretrial motion to quash. Had the defendant made such a motion, the
indictment would have been quashed, but since no such motion was made,
the insufficiency was waived. Thus, the indictment was not vulnerable to
further attack and was sufficient to support defendant's conviction.
In June a panel of the court was once again presented with an opportu-
nity to apply the American Plant Food rule in Pollard v. State.9 4 The de-
fendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and on appeal alleged for
the first time that the indictment was void as fundamentally defective for
failing to allege the specific manner in which the abduction was accom-
plished. The court rejected this contention, citing American Plant Food,
and asserted that "indictments which allege an offense in the terms of the
applicable penal statute are sufficient."95 This observation seems to be in
keeping with the dissent in Exparte Canady.
The hypertechnical approach to indictment construction is not yet be-
hind us.
Indictment Copy to Accused in Custody--A "'Must" Ten Days Before
90. 508 S.W.2d at 604.
91. 563 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
92. Id at 270.
93. Id at 269.
94. 567 S.W.2d II (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
95. Id. at 12.
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Trial. In Johnson v. State96 defendant was under arrest for aggravated
robbery. Awaiting trial in jail, he was served with a copy of his indictment
less than ten days before his scheduled trial date. On the date his trial was
to begin, defendant requested a continuance because he had not had ten
days after being served with a copy of the indictment to prepare for trial.
The trial judge refused, the trial was held, and defendant was convicted.
The court reversed and remanded because defendant, being in custody,
had an absolute right on demand to a period of at least ten days between
being served with a copy of the indictment and being put to trial.97
B. Statute of Limitations
Article 12.05(b) and (c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure calls
for the tolling of an applicable statute of limitations during the pendency
of an indictment, information, or complaint.98 A trio of cases during the
survey period clarifies what is required to invoke this tolling provision.
The court sitting en banc held in Exparte Ward9 that a complaint filed in
a justice court will not toll running of the applicable statute of limitations
in a felony case. Defendant was indicted for aggravated rape on July 6,
1977, over three years and three months after the alleged rape. The indict-
ment, however, alleged, and the State was prepared to prove, that on
March 14, 1974, a complaint was filed in justice court against defendant
Ward, who at the time could only be identified as an unknown white male
with the nickname "Cherokee" and be described by height, weight, and
hair color. Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus asserting that the in-
dictment was void on its face. The court dismissed the indictment as void
on its face, pointing out that article 12.05(c) required the indictment, infor-
mation, or complaint to be "filed in a court of competent jurisdiction" in
order to toll the running of the limitation statute, and the justice court did
not have jurisdiction of the felony offense charged.'°°
The court explained that a contrary holding "would be to allow a 'credi-
ble person' to file a complaint in the justice court charging an accused with
a felony offense without inquiry being made about the nature of the
knowledge upon which an affiant bases his factual statements, and thereby
toll the statute of limitations forever."'' The holding in Ward means that
a prosecutor who has a reasonably accurate description of an unknown
96. 567 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
97. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.12 (Vernon 1966).
98. Id. arts. 12.05(b), (c) (Vernon 1977) provide:
(b) The time during the pendency of an indictment, information, or com-
plaint shall not be computed in the period of limitation.
(c) The term "during the pendency," as used herein, means that period of
time beginning with the day the indictment, information, or complaint is filed
in a court of competent jurisdiction, and ending with the day such accusation
is, by an order of a trial court having jurisdiction thereof, determined to be
invalid for any reason.
99. 560 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).




person accused of committing a felony must go ahead and seek an indict-
ment of the unknown person fitting the description, as permitted by article
21.07.102
Ex parle Sla pin10 3 and Vasquez v. Slate' 4 make it clear that once an
indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, the applicable stat-
ute of limitation is tolled under article 12.05 whether that indictment turns
out to be valid, voidable, or void.' °5 Slavin, a case of first impression,
points out that as long as the second indictment is brought under the same
penal statute as the first indictment, the fact that the first indictment was
voidable and quashed, or void and dismissed as fundamentally defective,
does not prevent the first indictment from tolling the statute of limitations
for the period of time the indictments were in effect.
Query: How can a void indictment, which is a nullity incapable of even
invoking a trial court's jurisdiction,0 6 be capable of tolling a statute of
limitations?
Vasquez dealt with the defendant's contention that because article
12.05(c) makes reference only to "invalid" indictments, a valid indictment
fails to toll the running of the statute of limitations. The court rejected this
argument, concluding that the legislature could not have intended such an
"absurd result."'10 7
C. Speedy Trial
Article V, section 510' of the Texas Constitution has been amended, ef-
fective January 1, 1978, to give the court of criminal appeals additional
power to grant extraordinary writs in cases regarding criminal matters.
The court had occasion to exercise this new power in Thomas v. Steven-
son, ° 9 in which the court ordered that a writ of mandamus issue in the
event that a speedy criminal trial was not granted below. Petitioner
Thomas was serving a life sentence in Texas for attempted murder. De-
tainers were filed against him with the Texas Department of Corrections
based on two burglary indictments in Victoria County. Petitioner filed
several requests with the trial court for a speedy trial that were ignored.
He then filed a petition for writ of mandamus.
102. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.07 (Vernon 1966) provides: "When the name
of the person is unknown to the grand jury, that fact shall be stated, and if it be the accused,
a reasonably accurate description of him shall be given in the indictment."
103. 554 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
104. 557 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
105. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra for an explanation of the difference be-
tween "void" and "voidable" indictments.
106. See, e.g., State v. Olsen, 360 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1962) (per curiam) (jurisdiction of
court to try issue of insanity before trial of main charge can be invoked only by a motion or
request for a trial of the issue of present insanity andany judgment entered on question of
insanity without such motion or request is void); Exparie Caldwell, 383 S.W.2d 587, 589
(Tex. Crim. App. 1964) (absent notice of appeal, a court is without jurisdiction to enter any
order other than to dismiss the appeal).
107. 557 S.W.2d at 784.
108. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5.
109. 561 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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The court of criminal appeals used its new power only to compel a
speedy trial for petitioner. Although the court indicated that the peti-
tioner's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated, it did
not order the cases dismissed because it lacked mandamus jurisdiction to
compel a dismissal of criminal charges."' The court, however, indicated
that after July 1, 1978, the effective date of the Texas Speedy Trial Act, I '
it may have mandamus jurisdiction to compel a reluctant trial court to
dismiss in conformity with the dictates of the new Act. 1
2
D. Double Jeopardy, Collateral Estoppel, and Carving
Double Jeopardy-Reversal Solely for Lack of Sufficient Evidence. The
defendant in Burks v. United States"' asserted an insanity defense to a
bank robbery charge, but was convicted by a jury in federal district court.
The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the conviction, holding that the
government had not fulfilled its burden of proving sanity beyond a reason-
able doubt. The United States Supreme Court, expressly overruling sev-
eral earlier decisions, held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment precludes a second trial once the reversing court has found the
evidence insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty. The Court ex-
plained that otherwise the prosecution is unconstitutionally afforded a sec-
ond opportunity to supply evidence that it failed to muster in the first
trial. ' 4
The Supreme Court was careful to distinguish a reversal based on insuf-
ficiency of the evidence from a reversal for trial error, noting that the fifth
amendment does not preclude the retrial of a defendant whose conviction
is set aside for an error in the proceedings leading to conviction. 15 The
Court also made clear that a defendant does not waive this right to a judg-
ment of acquittal (directed verdict) by moving for a new trial, either as one
of his remedies or as his sole remedy." 6 There can be no doubt about the
applicability of Burks to state criminal proceedings. In Greene v. Mas-
sey,17 handed down the same day, the Supreme Court remanded a Fifth
Circuit decision that affirmed the trial court's denial of federal habeas
corpus relief to a Florida murder defendant for further consideration in
light of Burks.
Attachment of Double Jeopardy in Jury Trials. The point at which jeop-
110. Id at 847 n. 1. The court concurred with the rationale of Pope v. Ferguson, 445
S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1969), in which the supreme court concluded that it did not have manda-
mus jurisdiction to compel a dismissal of criminal charges.
I1I. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 28.061, 32A.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
112. 561 S.W.2d at 847 n.l. The court noted that the Texas Speedy Trial Act would
require indictments to be dismissed unless a speedy trial ensued. The court chose to reserve
judgment on whether Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1969), would remain valid
after the effective date of the Act.
113. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id. at 15-17.
116. Id at 17.
117. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
1979]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ardy attaches in a state jury trial is no longer open to question; it attaches
when the jury is impaneled and sworn, according to a six-to-three majority
of the United States Supreme Court in Crist v. Bretz." 8 The Court con-
cluded that this rule, applied in federal courts since 1963,'19 is an integral
part of the fifth amendment made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment because of the need to protect an accused's interest in retain-
ing a chosen jury, "an interest with roots deep in the historic development
of trial by jury."' 2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that
jeopardy does not attach until an accused has pleaded, even though a jury
has been sworn to try him.' 2 ' With the advent of Crist, this, of course, can
no longer be the law in Texas.
Double Jeopardy-Federal Government Appeal after Midtrial Acquittal or
Dismissal. Unlike Texas prosecutors, federal prosecutors can, pursuant
to federal statute, 2 2 appeal a decision, judgment, or order of a district
court dismissing an indictment except when prohibited by the double jeop-
ardy clause. In 1975 the United States Supreme Court substantially cur-
tailed a federal prosecutor's statutory right to appeal the midtrial dismissal
of an indictment. United States v. Jenkins 23 held that under the double
jeopardy clause, the Government had no right to appeal such dismissals
because "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of
factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged, would have
been required upon reversal and remand."'' 24
Now, just three years later, the Supreme Court has expressly overruled
Jenkins in United States v. Scott. 2  So, once again in federal criminal
trials if the defendant obtains a midtrial termination in his favor before
any determination of guilt or innocence, the federal prosecutor can appeal
and seek reversal and a new trial without violating the double jeopardy
clause. The five-Justice majority explained that the Court in Jenkins
pressed too far the concept of the defendant's valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal. When a defendant obtains a midtrial
termination of the proceedings against him without any finding by a court
or jury as to his guilt or innocence, he has not been deprived of his valued
right to go to the first jury. The double jeopardy clause does not relieve a
defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice.' 26 The dissent,
however, argued that the most fundamental rule in the history of double
jeopardy jurisprudence is that a retrial following a final judgment for the
accused, no matter at what stage of the trial, threatens intolerable interfer-
118. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
119. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
120. 437 U.S. at 36.
121. Rameriz v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 507, 352 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
123. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
124. Id at 370.
125. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
126. Id at 98-100.
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ence with the constitutional policy against multiple trials. 27
Double Jeopardy--Mistrial Declared over Defendant's Objection. The
United States Supreme Court reemphasized in Arizona v. Washington12 8
that a new trial is permissible under the double jeopardy clause when a
mistrial is declared over a defendant's objection only if the termination of
the earlier trial is justified by a manifest necessity. In this situation the
prosecutor must shoulder the heavy burden of demonstrating a high de-
gree of necessity. Although the Court appeared unanimous as to the rule
thus stated, there was a six-to-three split on the application of the rule to
the circumstances presented.
During the opening statement, the defendant's attorney made improper
and prejudicial remarks about prosecutorial misconduct in an earlier trial
of defendant. After considerable deliberation the trial judge granted the
prosecutor's motion for a mistrial over defendant's objection. At the sub-
sequent trial, defendant's double jeopardy motion was rejected. The case
then was certified to the Supreme Court, which held that a subsequent trial
would not violate the double jeopardy clause even though the record con-
tained neither a specific finding of manifest necessity by the trial court nor
all the factors that led the trial court to declare a mistrial.'29 The majority
based its determination on the proposition that reviewing courts must ac-
cord substantial deference to a trial judge's determination that the im-
proper conduct of defendant's attorney is so prejudicial as to leave no
alternative but to declare a mistrial to secure the ends of justice.' 30
The practical procedural lesson to be learned from Washington, by pros-
ecutors and defense attorneys alike, is that the facts pertaining to a prose-
cutor's mistrial motion, made over defendant's objection, should be clearly
stated in the record. If the trial court does grant the prosecutor's motion,
then the prosecutor should be certain that the trial court makes an explicit
finding of manifest necessity with reasons stated in support of such finding.
Although such procedural assistance is not consitutionally mandated,
"[review of any trial court decision is, of course, facilitated by findings
and by an explanation of the reasons supporting the decision."'
' 3
'
Double Jeopardy-Defense Motion for Mistrial. In United States v.
Jorn3 2 the Supreme Court stated that "where circumstances develop not
attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the de-
fendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to re-
prosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial
or judicial error."'' 33 Rios v. State 34 adds an interesting footnote to the
127. Id at 104.
128. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
129. Id at 516-17.
130. Id at 510-11.
131. Id. at 517.
132. 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (plurality opinion).
133. Id at 485.
134. 557 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Cnim. App. 1977).
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general rule. Through no fault of the prosecutor, a state witness gave im-
proper testimony that was prejudicial to the defendant. The attorney for
defendant moved for a mistrial. Defendant, who was present, said noth-
ing, and the motion for mistrial was granted. At the subsequent trial, de-
fendant asserted a double jeopardy bar on the ground that the trial judge
in the earlier trial had failed to ask defendant whether he personally
wanted a mistrial.
The court of criminal appeals ruled against defendant's contention be-
cause in Texas a defendant does not have the right to hybrid representa-
tion,' "35 and also because defendant impliedly consented to the waiver of
his double jeopardy claim by standing silently by while his attorney asked
for a mistrial. The first reason is questionable. The court relied on the
majority opinion in Landers v. State j36 that an accused does not have theYpinion
right to hybrid representation. As pointed out in the Landers dissent, 37
however, the majority opinion simply does not square with the clear lan-
guage of article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution, which provides: "In
all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . shall have the right of being
heard by himself or counsel, or both. . .. 138 The second reason appears
valid in light of United States v. Dinitz,139 wherein the United States
Supreme Court stated that it had "implicitly rejected the contention that
the permissibility of a retrial following a mistrial or a reversal of a convic-
tion on appeal depends on a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of
a constitutional right."" In any event, the practical approach of careful
trial judges, in situations like this, would be to ask the defendant on the
record whether he personally concurs in his attorney's request for a mis-
trial.
Collateral Estoppel. The Fifth Circuit recently clarified the collateral es-
toppel aspect of fifth amendment double jeopardy protection in Hutchings
v. Estelle. 4 ' In a habeas corpus proceeding a Texas state prisoner con-
victed of felony theft was claiming the collateral estoppel protection of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. In his first trial de-
fendant was indicted for the offense of burglary with intent to commit
theft. A jury found him not guilty. Thereafter, defendant was tried on an
indictment for theft of certain guns which had been taken in the burglary
for which defendant had been found not guilty. In the second trial, a jury
found defendant guilty.
Because an assertion of collateral estoppel raises issues of constitutional
fact, a reviewing court must examine the entire record. 142 The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals did so and reached the following conclusions. The
135. Id at 91.
136. 550 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
137. Id at 281.
138. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
139. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
140. Id at 609-10 n.ll.
141. 564 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1977).
142. Ash v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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crucial issue in the first trial was who committed the burglarious entry of
the house. Since there was no eyewitness evidence as to which of three
companions, including defendant, burglarized the house, a jury verdict of
not guilty was rendered. The only issue in the second trial was not an issue
at all in the first trial-who stole the guns that were in the burglarized
house? There was ample eyewitness evidence that defendant had the guns
shortly after the burglary and tried to sell them.
The jury in the first trial quite rationally could hold that the State had
not identified the burglar beyond a reasonable doubt, yet at the same time
it could also be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, had the issue been
before the jury, 4 3 that the defendant stole the guns, if not by his own
efforts, then through the help of his two companions. The court of appeals,
therefore, concluded that collateral estoppel did not apply since it is only
established if the prior not guilty verdict necessarily meant that the de-
fendant could not have been guilty of the offense charged in the second
prosecution. 44
Carving-A Texas Double Jeopardy Concept. The carving doctrine is a
long recognized Texas double jeopardy concept whereby "a person cannot
be convicted of different parts of a single transaction, though said parts are
in contemplation of law distinct offenses."' 4 ' This means that a Texas
prosecutor can carve as large an offense out of a single transaction as he
can, but he must only cut once. He cannot obtain a conviction for one
offense arising out of a single transaction and then later obtain another
conviction for a different offense arising out of the same transaction.
The decisions of the court of criminal appeals over the years concerning
carving have not always been reconcilable, usually because of confusion
over what constitutes a "single transaction." Recently, however, the court
seems to have settled on a standard definition of a single transaction: "[A]n
uninterrupted and continuous sequence of events or assaultive acts di-
rected toward a single victim."'" Yet one of the three carving cases
handed down during the survey period indicates that confusion over the
meaning of "single transaction" as used in the carving doctrine has not
been eliminated.
O'Briant v. State' is an understandable and correct application of the
carving doctrine. Defendant first robbed a waitress at gunpoint inside a
cafe and then went out the back door of the cafe where he shot and
143. In Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit expanded
Ash v. Swenson to hold that an evidentiary matter previously adjudicated against the State
could not be relitigated (used) in a subsequent criminal prosecution. This includes testi-
mony previously rejected by a trial jury in another case. See Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d
1014 (5th Cir. 1975). There the court's finding that the identity of the gun thief was not
decided in the first trial was crucial.
144. See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972).
145. Exparle Joseph, 558 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); see Wright v. State,
17 Tex. Ct. App. 152 (1884).
146. Exparte Birl, 545 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Hawkins v. State, 535
S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
147. 556 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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wounded another cafe employee who was in the parking lot. Defendant
was first convicted for armed robbery and later for attempted murder. On
appeal he contended that his conviction for attempted murder was barred
by the carving doctrine since the robbery and shooting constituted a single
transaction. The court rejected this interpretation of the carving doctrine,
pointing out the new definition of "single transaction" quoted above. 14 8 In
this case, the court explained, there were two victims and two separate and
distinct transactions: inside the cafe victim number one, the waitress, was
subjected to armed robbery in one transaction, and in the cafe parking lot
victim number two was shot and wounded in the second transaction.
Exparle Olson'49 also applied the new standard definition. Defendant
was first convicted of the offense of murder, followed by a conviction for
robbery by assault. The facts of the case show that defendant was robbing
a convenience store when the clerk made a movement and defendant shot
and killed him. The court sustained defendant's contention that he had
been subjected to double jeopardy by way of the carving doctrine, citing
Exparte Birl,5° in which the court had reached the same conclusion when
confronted with essentially the same fact situation as presented in Olson.
In Birl the defendant started out the door of the small grocery store he
had just robbed when the clerk, who had been on the floor, made a move-
ment and defendant shot him. Defendant was convicted first for armed
robbery and then for murder. On appeal the State argued that the robbery
offense was complete when defendant took the money, and the act of
standing in the doorway interrupted the transaction so that the murder was
a separate transaction. In dismissing the murder conviction by reason of
the carving doctrine, the BiM! court cited the standard definition of single
transaction and explained that "[tjhe time sequence of events was continu-
ous and did not break the chain of antecedent violence perpetrated upon
the complaining witness so as to give rise to the inception of another sepa-
rate and distinct offense."'' 5
Exparte Joseph'52 is a carving case that cannot be reconciled with the
court's holdings in Birl, O'Briant, and Olson. At a time when the old
Texas Penal Code was still in effect, defendant Joseph drove his victim to a
secluded spot where he first forced her to commit oral sodomy and then
raped her. He was convicted by a jury for the rape and sentenced to twelve
years. Later, he was tried and convicted by a jury for the offense of sod-
omy and given ten years.
The defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus contending that the second
trial for the offense of sodomy should have been barred by the carving
doctrine since both offenses arose out of the same operative set of events,
at the same time, against the same complaining witness. The court rejected
defendant's carving contention, stating that "[s]ince both the rape and the
148. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
149. 560 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
150. 545 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
151. Id at 171.
152. 558 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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act of sodomy upon the prosecutrix herein were not proven by the same
evidence and the act of sodomy was complete prior to the commission of
the act of rape, the doctrine of carving does not bar multiple convictions of
the [defendant]."' 53
The Joseph decision is wholly contrary to the court's asserted definition
of "single transaction." '54 In Joseph there was an uninterrupted and con-
tinuous sequence of events or assaultive acts directed toward a single vic-
tim. Just as in Olson and Birl, "the time sequence of events was
continuous and did not break the chain of antecedent violence perpetrated
upon the complaining witness so as to give rise to the inception of another
separate and distinct offense." '55 The kaleidoscopic treatment that the
words "single transaction" have received at the hands of the court in carv-
ing doctrine cases is reminiscent of Humpty Dumpty's discourse on the
meaning of words: "When I use a word. . . it means just what I choose it
to mean-neither more nor less."'
' 56
E. Venue
Prosecutors and trial judges take heed. The court of criminal appeals
has twice during the survey period reminded one and all that a defendant
who files a motion for change of venue, supported by affidavits pursuant to
the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,157 is entitled to a change
of venue as a matter of law absent controverting affidavits filed by the
State.158
F. Discovery
Brady Motions. The diligent defense attorney should always make a
Brady motion,' 59 but a general Brady motion, for example, a request for
"all Brady material" or for "anything exculpatory," is the same as no
Brady motion at all. This is the effect of Frank v. State, 60 which adopts
the guidelines of United States v. Agurs16 1 for determining when a con-
153. Id at 893.
154. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
155. Exparte Olson, 560 S.W.2d at 689.
156. L. CARROL, ALICE THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS ch. 6 (1872). The full exchange
between Alice and Humpty Dumpty reads:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is" said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many
different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's
all."
157. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 31.03 (Vernon 1966).
158. Stapleton v. State, 565 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Durrough v. State, 562
S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
159. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), due process was held to require prosecu-
tors to disclose exculpatory information upon the request of defense counsel.
160. 558 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
161. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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victed defendant will be granted a new trial by reason of the prosecutor's
failure to volunteer unrequested exculpatory information.
While the Supreme Court in Agurs, for the first time, interprets the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments as imposing a con-
stitutional duty on state and federal prosecutors to volunteer unrequested
exculpatory information, the imposition of the duty on prosecutors is of
little practical value to defendants. This is so because a prosecutor's fail-
ure to volunteer such information, whether deliberate or otherwise, does
not violate the duty so as to result in a new trial unless a reviewing court,
after reviewing all of the evidence, finds that "the omitted evidence creates
a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist" 1 62 as to the defendant's
guilt. 163
Conversely, a prosecutor's failure to respond to a specific Brady motion,
that is, a pretrial request for exculpatory information described and identi-
fied in as specific terms as possible, will result in a due process violation
and thus a new trial if the reviewing court finds no more than that the
"suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial."'164
The impact of this double standard can best be seen by applying each
standard to the facts of Frank. Defendant, a black man, was charged with
aggravated robbery, which he denied. He was tried before an all white
jury. The several eyewitnesses who identified defendant as the robber
were white, whereas the several eyewitnesses who said defendant was not
the robber were black. Another white eyewitness, Stone, was not called to
testify after the prosecutor brought him into the courtroom during the trial
and he was unable to positively identify defendant. The prosecutor did
not inform defendant's attorney of Stone's failure to identify defendant.
Under the non-request standard of Agurs and Frank, defendant failed to
convince the court that the omitted evidence created a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt.'65 Had the specific Brady motion standard of Agurs and
Frank been applicable, however, defendant probably would have, and cer-
tainly should have, obtained a new trial, since he would only have needed
to convince the court that the "suppressed evidence might have affected
the outcome of the trial."'66
As a practical matter, Frank and Agurs emphasize doing what diligent
defense attorneys should already be doing anyway, that is, pack into their
Brady motions detailed descriptions of as many exculpatory sources, situa-
tions, and circumstances as their investigation and foresight can develop,
so as to maximize the opportunity of getting a new trial under the more
liberal due process standard, should suppression occur. As can be seen
from the facts of Frank, however, not all suppression pertains to pretrial
162. Id at 112.
163. The rule is not applicable to unrequested evidence which "is obviously of such sub-
stantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without
a specific request." Id at 110.
164. Id at 104.
165. Frank, 558 S.W.2d at 14.
166. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.
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evidence, and it is not always easy to anticipate the kinds of suppression
that can occur. This necessarily brings into question the whole approach
of Agurs, as adopted by Frank. "It shall be the primary duty of all prose-
cuting attorneys. . . not to convict, but to see that justice is done."' 167 The
majority in Agurs acknowledges this,'6 8 and since it is a command of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, it must also be acknowledged by the
court of criminal appeals.
In seeing that justice is done, both federal and Texas prosecutors have
the duty to "make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant . . . of
the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor. . . that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the
punishment."' 69 This prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
has been an aspect of due process of law since Mooney v. Holohan,170 a
fact recognized by the court of criminal appeals in Means v. State.'
7
'
When a prosecutor knows or should know that particular infoirmation
has exculpatory value and does not reveal the information to a defense
attorney, be it calculated, merely advertent, or inadvertent, there is a
breach of the prosecutor's duty. Such a breach of duty should constitute a
denial of due process requiring a new trial if "the suppressed evidence
might have affected the outcome of the trial." This is the standard im-
posed by.Agurs when the defendant makes a specific Brady motion request
for exculpatory information.' 72 It should also be the standard when no
Brady motion, or only a general Brady motion, is filed. Whether a defense
attorney exercises the diligence or has the insight to specifically request
suppressed information, or has the foresight to anticipate the future sup-
pression of information during trial, is beside the point.
Depositions. Deposition in Texas criminal cases continues to be a discov-
ery tool for defendants in name only. To obtain permission to take deposi-
tions under article 39.02,13 the defendant must show good reason to a trial
court whose discretion is described as "wide,"' 174 but in fact is practically
unlimited. This is so because an abuse of discretion can only result in a
new trial if the defendant is able to demonstrate that he was injured by the
trial court's refusal, 75 and the court of criminal appeals has seldom found
injury to have resulted from such a refusal.
Usually a criminal defendant wants and needs to take the depositions of
state witnesses who will not voluntarily make themselves available for in-
167. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.01 (Vernon 1977).
168. 427 U.S. at 104.
169. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1976). See also State
Bar of Texas, Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13, DR 7-103 (1973).
170. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
171. 429 S.W.2d 490, 493 (1968).
172. 427 U.S. at 104.
173. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.02 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-78).




vestigative questioning. This was the situation in James v. State' 76
wherein the court reiterated its previous position that where the witnesses
sought to be deposed testified at trial and were subjected to cross-examina-
tion, § the defendant has not sustained any injury by reason of the trial
court's refusal to permit pretrial depositions of said witnesses, even if the
refusal were to be considered an abuse of discretion.' 77
As any civil trial attorney can verify, the right to thoroughly cross-ex-
amine a witness at trial is seldom an adequate substitute for a pretrial dep-
osition. The court's almost automatic rejection of the contention that lack
of advance access to witnesses is injurious to a defendant appears unrealis-
tic. The attitude of the court, however, seems fixed, and any change will
almost surely have to come from the legislature.
G. Incompetency to Stand Trial
If at any time, either before trial or during trial, evidence comes to the
attention of a Texas trial judge of sufficient force to create in the judge's
mind reasonable grounds to doubt a defendant's competency to stand
trial, 78 the judge must impanel a separate jury to determine whether de-
fendant is in fact competent to stand trial. 179 The procedure prescribed by
the Texas statute for determining a defendant's competency to stand trial
prior to the beginning of a trial on the merits 80 has not proved trouble-
some for the court of criminal appeals, but that part of the statute provid-
ing the procedure to be followed once a trial on the merits is underway' 8'
has caused a split in the court. Section 2(b) of article 46.02 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure reads: "If during the trial evidence of the defendant's
incompetency is brought to the attention of the court from any source, the
court must conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine
whether ...there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency to
stand trial."'
81 2
In Johnson v. State"3 the court sitting en banc considered the meaning
of section 2(b). A six-judge majority construed the language of the section
to mean that the trial court need not interrupt the trial on the merits unless
and until the judge concludes reasonable grounds exist to doubt the de-
fendant's competency. Once the judge entertains such a doubt, he then
must interrupt the trial on the merits and impanel a separate jury, pursu-
176. 563 S.W.2d 599 (1978).
177. 563 S.W.2d at 603. See Greer v. State, 523 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);
McKinney v. State, 491 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
178. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § l(a) (Vernon 1979) provides that "A
person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to con-
sult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
179. Id art. 46.02 is, in part, a codification of the constitutional requirement announced
in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
180. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(a) (Vernon 1979).
181. Id art. 46.02, § 2(b).
182. Id
183. 564 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
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ant to section 4(a), to try the competency issue.' 84
The dissent argued that whenever any evidence of incompetency from
any source is brought to the attention of the trial court, section 2(b) re-
quires the court to stop the trial and conduct a hearing out of the presence
of the jury for the limited purpose of determining if there is evidence of
sufficient force to create in the judge's mind reasonable grounds to doubt
defendant's competency. Only if the section 2(b) hearing leads to such a
conclusion, said the dissent, must the trial court impanel a separate section
4(a) jury to try the competency issue. 85
The dissent further concluded that "[tihe whole purpose of a Section
2(b) inquiry is to determine whether the claims [of incompetency] are base-
less. If only well-founded claims trigger Sec. 2(b), [as the majority would
have it,] then a Sec. 4(a) hearing will always follow, and the Sec. 2(b) in-
quiry would be a wasteful formality."' 86 Judge Odom, who authored the
dissent, appears justified in asserting that "[t]he majority's confusion is
manifest.""'7
III. PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS
A. Plea Bargaining
Now that plea bargaining has finally "come out of the closet,"' 88 courts
are being called upon to define the limits of the activity. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized the importance of counsel during plea bar-
gaining,' 89 the need for a public record indicating that a plea was know-
ingly and voluntarily made,1 90 and the requirement that a prosecutor's
plea bargaining promise be kept.'' In its most recent decision in this area
of the law, Bordenkircher v. Hayes,'92 the Court held five-to-four that a
state prosecutor could threaten to reindict and prosecute a defendant on a
more serious charge if he did not plead guilty to the lesser offense with
which he was originally charged without violating the fourteenth amend-
ment due process prohibition against prosecutorial vindictiveness. De-
fendant Hayes was originally indicted by a Kentucky grand jury for
uttering a forged instrument. During plea bargaining negotiations, the
prosecutor told defendant that if he did not plead guilty in return for a
recommended five-year prison sentence, he would obtain a reindictment of
him as a habitual criminal by reason of two prior felony convictions and
subject him to a mandatory life sentence. When the defendant rejected the
184. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 4(a) (Vernon 1979).
185. 564 S.W.2d at 713.
186. Id
187. Id
188. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978), the Supreme Court describes it
as an "open acknowledgement of this previously clandestine practice."
189. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
190. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
191. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
192. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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five-year offer, the prosecutor successfully executed his threat and Hayes
was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The majority distinguished Bordenkircher from Blackledge v. Perry,'93
in which the due process clause was held to prohibit a prosecutor from
vindictively reindicting a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge for
having exercised an appellate remedy. In Blackledge it was the State's uni-
lateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant for having chosen to exer-
cise a legal right that violated due process, while Bordenkircher, on the
other hand, involved the "give-and-take" of plea bargaining where there is
no punishment or retaliation as long as the accused is free to accept or
reject the prosecutor's offer.' 94 The majority conceded that confronting a
defendant with the risk of a more severe punishment may discourage the
defendant from asserting his trial rights, but that this was an inevitable and
permissible attribute of any legitimate system that encourages the negotia-
tion of pleas.'95
Three dissenting justices'96 maintained that prosecutorial vindictiveness,
in whatever context, is still vindictiveness and the due process clause
should protect an accused against it. 197 Justice Powell, in a narrower view,
stated that due process protection should apply to this particular case be-
cause the prosecutor's admitted purpose "was to discourage and then to
penalize with unique severity [defendant's] exercise of constitutional
rights.'198
Whether a prosecutor's plea bargaining promise was kept was the issue
in two cases handed down by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Wash-
ington v. State' 99 and Nunez v. State.2°° Washington v. State involved a
plea bargaining agreement in which defendant agreed to plead guilty to an
aggravated robbery charge and an attempted murder charge in return for
the prosecutor's promise to dismiss a pending capital murder charge. The
defendant plead guilty to the two lesser charges as agreed, but before the
prosecutor dismissed the capital murder case, the defendant filed notice of
appeal in the two guilty plea cases. Thereafter the prosecutor proceeded
with the capital murder case and obtained a death penalty conviction. The
court held that since the defendant never agreed as part of the plea bargain
to forego his right to appeal, he did not breach the bargain when he filed
notice of appeal. Thus the State was bound by its agreement to terminate
the capital murder trial.20' When the court reversed the capital murder
conviction and ordered said prosecution dismissed, in effect it specifically
enforced the original plea bargain. 2°2
193. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
194. 434 U.S. at 363.
195. Id at 364.
196. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall.
197. 434 U.S. at 368.
198. Id at 373.
199. 559 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crinm. App. 1977).
200. 565 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).




In Nunez v. State2" 3 the defendant pled guilty in return for the prosecu-
tor's promise to make no recommendation regarding punishment. Al-
though the prosecutor kept his promise and made no recommendation as
to punishment, the probation officer did recommend the maximum penalty
permissible under law. The trial court refused defendant's motion to with-
draw his guilty plea and assessed punishment at eighteen years in prison.
The court of criminal appeals rejected defendant's contention that the pro-
bation officer was an agent of the prosecution and upheld the conviction
imposed by the trial court. The court reasoned that "[p]robation officers
are assigned or designated by the courts. . . . The district attorney's office
does not employ a probation officer nor do they have any authority over
the probation officers." 2' The reasoning of the court may be technically
correct, but it is hard to shake the feeling that the State of Texas did not
keep its word.
B. Guilty Pleas
Pleading guilty is a significant and serious event because it constitutes a
waiver by the defendant of his fundamental rights to a jury trial,205 to
confront his accusers, 2 s to present witnesses in his defense,2"7 to remain
silent,20 8 and to be convicted by proof beyond all reasonable doubt.2°
This is why the United States Supreme Court has imposed upon the states,
through the fourteenth amendment due process clause, the duty to interro-
gate defendants who plead guilty to ensure that the plea is being entered
intelligently and voluntarily and that the waiver of these fundamental
rights affirmatively appears on the record.2 0 Article 26.132" of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure is a codification of this constitutional man-
date. Under this article Texas trial judges now must affirmatively deter-
mine by interrogation and admonishment that the defendant who pleads
guilty is mentally competent, voluntarily pleading guilty, and is aware of
the range of punishment attached to the offense. In the case of a plea
bargain defendant must be told that the trial court can follow or reject any
plea bargain agreement and that defendant may withdraw his plea of
guilty in the event of rejection.
Since a large majority of criminal cases are disposed of by guilty pleas, it
is most unfortunate that too many trial judges continue to carelessly han-
dle their constitutionally mandated admonishment obligations under arti-
cle 26.13. It is also unfortunate that the court of criminal appeals all too
often protects the slipshod efforts of trial judges under the "substantial
203. 565 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
204. Id at 537.
205. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
206. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400.(1965).
207. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
208. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
209. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
210. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
211. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
19791
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
compliance" clause of article 26.13212 when it appears obvious that the
record does not reflect an intelligent and voluntary waiver as required by
the due process clause. Of course, some of the admonishment efforts of
trial judges are so patently deficient that they are beyond the help of even
the most generous interpretation of the "substantial compliance" clause,
leaving the court with no choice but to reverse and remand. This is true in
cases where no admonishment is provided regarding the range of punish-
ment,213 where admonishment regarding the range of punishment is given
by someone other than the trial judge,21 4 and where the admonishment
describes the wrong range of punishment.21 5 In two cases during the sur-
vey period court majorities made questionable use of the article 26.13(c)
"substantial compliance" clause.
At the time Kidd v. State216 was handed down, article 26.13(a)(2) re-
quired that a trial judge admonish regarding "the fact that the recommen-
dation of the prosecuting attorney as to punishment is not binding on the
court. ,2 7 The en banc majority of the court held that since there was no
showing in the record that a plea bargain existed and since the trial court
assessed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor, substantial com-
pliance with the statute was indicated by the record. As the dissent cor-
rectly pointed out, 2 '8 not only was there no substantial compliance, there
was no compliance at all with the admonishment requirement regarding
recommendations of the prosecuting attorney. Absent such compliance,
the record did not affirmatively reflect a voluntary guilty plea as required
by Boykin v. Alabama.2t 9
In Richards v. State221 the trial court made no inquiry whether the guilty
plea was free and voluntary.221 An appellate court majority held that the
trial court's question, "Have you been promised anything to cause you to
make this plea?," constituted substantial compliance with this admonish-
ment requirement of article 26.13.222 According to the dissent the record
did not affirmatively show that the plea was voluntary, as constitutionally
required. "There was no inquiry as to whether, despite the lack of a prom-
ise,. . . [he] was entering his plea because of any duress, fear, undue com-
plusion, and persuasion or other offers of leniency, improper influence, etc.
He was not even asked in. . .a general way if the plea was being freely
and voluntarily made. '223 Because compliance with the requirements of
212. Id art. 26.13(c).
213. McDade v. State, 562 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
214. Murray v. State, 561 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
215. Borrego v. State, 558 S.W.2d I (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
216. 563 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
217. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). This lan-
guage remains unchanged in the present provision.
218. 563 S.W.2d at 940.
219. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
220. 562 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
221. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). This language
remains unchanged in the present provision.
222. 562 S.W.2d at 458.
223. Id at 460.
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article 26.13 involves only a simple matter of routine, in the words of
Judge Onion: "It never ceases to amaze me that this court . . . will not
require legally trained judges to properly admonish defendants as to their
guilty pleas .. . .We have really reached a sad state of affairs.
224
IV. TRIAL
A. Right to an Interpreter
It is fundamental that the sixth amendment confrontation clause in-
cludes the right of cross-examination. 225 Texas has long held that this con-
stitutional right is denied when the State fails to furnish an interpreter to a
non-English speaking defendant because such a defendant cannot under-
stand the testimony of witnesses against him as it is being given, and thus
he has no way to react and respond through his attorney with effective
cross-examination questions.226 This sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion and cross-examination was reaffirmed by Ex pare Nanes,227 which
held that a non-English speaking defendant was denied that right when an
interpreter was only furnished when the defendant was on the stand.
Ferrell v. Estelle,22 8 a Fifth Circuit habeas corpus case, introduced four-
teenth amendment due process as another possible constitutional basis for
requiring an interpreter or some other effective means for enabling a de-
fendant to understand the trial proceedings as they unfold. Due process
requires a fair opportunity to defend against the state's accusation. The
defendant was a deaf Texas prisoner unable to use sign language or other-
wise effectively communicate except by writing. The Ferrell court ex-
plained that a defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings is, in
effect, not present at his own trial.229
This due process argument was well summarized by the Supreme Court
of Arizona:
A defendant's inability to spontaneously understand testimony being
given would undoubtedly limit his attorney's effectiveness, especially
on cross-examination. It would be as though a defendant were forced
to observe the proceedings from a soundproof booth or seated out of
hearing at the rear of the courtroom, being able to observe but not
comprehend the criminal processes whereby the state had put his free-
dom in jeopardy. Such a trial comes close to being an invective
against an insensible object, possibly infringing upon an accused's ba-
sic "right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial."23 °
224. Id at 459.
225. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
226. Garcia v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 593, 210 S.W.2d 574 (1948).
227. 558 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
228. 568 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1978). The court granted habeas corpus relief in this case,
but recalled its mandate and withdrew its opinion upon being advised of defendant's death.
Ferrell v. Estelle, 573 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1978).
229. United States ex rel Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970); State v.
Natividad, 111 Ariz. 191, 526 P.2d 730 (1974).
230. State v. Natividad, 111 Ariz. 191, 526 P.2d 730, 733 (1974). See generally Annot., 36
A.L.R.3d 276 (1971).
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B. Juries-Size and Juror Sources
Although it is without effect on Texas law, the United States Supreme
Court has concluded that the sixth and fourteenth amendments require
juries in criminal trials to contain more than five persons because a jury of
less than six persons would not constitute a fair cross-section of the com-
munity.23' The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas, San Antonio Division, rejected a constitutional challenge to its jury
selection plan, which utilized voter registration lists as the initial source of
names for potential jurors, in United States v. Gaona.232 The challengers
asserted that there was a substantial disparity233 between the representa-
tives of a cognizable class, Mexican-Americans, in the population and the
voter registration lists; thus, jurors selected under the plan were not being
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The court rejected the
challenge, stating that a successful constitutional challenge requires evi-
dence that a cognizable group has been purposely and systematically ex-
cluded. The majority reasoned that, while Mexican-Americans are a
cognizable group, as such, the fact that an identifiable group registers to
vote in a proportion lower than the rest of the population does not make
them a cognizable group for purposes of determining whether the selection
process violates the Constitution.234 Voter registration lists are the sole
and mandatory source of potential jurors for Texas courts. 235
C. Voir Dire-Generally
When a jury panel is selected for a case and assigned to a specific trial
court, that court must honor the unexplained demand of either the State or
the defendant for the panel to be shuffled. Como v. State236 holds that
denial constitutes reversible error even without a showing of harm. It
would appear, however, that a panel shuffle is mandatory only if demand
is made before the start of voir dire examination.237
Cartwright v. State238 established that it is reversible error per se for a
trial court to refuse a defendant's request to have a court reporter take
down the jury voir dire, pursuant to the rules of criminal procedure.239 In
Ex parte Jones2 ° the court determined that the Cartwright rule will be
applied prospectively, not retroactively. In reaching this decision, the
court took notice of the age old jurisprudential debate between natural law
scholars and the pragmatists as to whether law is eternal and merely dis-
covered, sometimes erroneously and sometimes not, the retroactive argu-
231. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
232. 445 F. Supp. 1237 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
233. An absolute disparity of 19% was contended.
234. 445 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
235. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2094 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
236. 557 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
237. Alexander v. State, 523 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
238. 527 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
239. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09(4) (Vernon 1979).
240. 562 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
[Vol. 33
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ment, or merely judge made and subject to changes in judicial policy, the
prospective argument.24" ' The court, however, pragmatically refused to
adopt either viewpoint exclusively, stating that prospective or retroactive
operation of an overruling decision depends on the particular circum-
stances.242 In this instance the court opted for prospective application of
Cartwright because "[wie perceive no interest of justice that would be
served by giving it retroactive effect, and [defendant] has advanced
none."
243
Voir dire in the absence of the defense attorney is no voir dire at all,
according to Eason v. State.244 Defendant's attorney was late and over
defendant's protest the court and the prosecutor conducted the voir dire
examination without him. In reversing defendant's conviction for driving
while intoxicated, the court of criminal appeals based its decision on the
fact "that voir dire examination of a jury panel is a critical stage of a crimi-
nal prosecution at which the right to counsel attaches, ' 245 and also 'on the
fact that both the Texas Constitution24 6 and the rules of criminal proce-
dure24 7 provide that an accused person shall have the right of being heard
by himself or counsel or both.
The question of when a venireman is subject to challenge for cause by
reason of bias or prejudice against the defendant24 was considered in sev-
eral cases during the survey period. It has long been the law in Texas that
a trial judge may, in his discretion, hold a venireman qualified who states
he can put aside an opinion that he may have formed regarding the guilt
or innocence of a defendant.249 Williams v. State250 holds that a trial court
has no such discretion with reference to a venireman who is biased or
prejudiced against the accused. In Williams a venireman admitted
prejudice against defendant as a result of business dealings with him, but
asserted that he could lay aside his bias and prejudice and base his deci-
sion on the evidence and the court's charge.2 l The trial court's rejection
of defendant's challenge for cause was held to be reversible error.
In light of this well-established rule, reaffirmed in Williams, that an ad-
mittedly biased or prejudiced venireman is disqualified as a matter of law
and thus cannot be rehabilitated by a promise to set aside his bias or
prejudice, it is difficult to understand the general assertion of the court in
Freeman v. State252 that a venireman who concedes past bias or prejudice
against a defendant, but who claims to have nopresent bias or prejudice, is
241. Id at 471 n.1. See generall, Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966).
242. 562 S.W.2d at 471.
243. Id
244. 563 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
245. Id at 947.
246. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
247. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.05 (Vernon 1977).
248. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
249. Id art. 35.16(a)(9).
250. 565 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
251. Id at 65.
252. 556 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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not susceptible to a challenge for cause.253 If there is a distinction between
a venireman who says he was prejudiced against a defendant but no longer
is, and a venireman who says he is prejudiced but will put that prejudice
aside, then it would appear to be a distinction without a difference.
Bias or prejudice against a defendant can be inferred from a venire-
man's admitted hostility toward defendant's witnesses or admitted friend-
ship for the State's witnesses. 254 Thus, in Hernandez v. State,255 a heroin
delivery case in which three of the four State's witnesses were police of-
ficers, it was held to be reversible error for a trial court to reject defend-
ant's article 35.16(a)(8) challenge for cause25 6 of a venireman who stated in
voir dire: "I don't think a police officer would tell a falsehood from the
witness stand., 25
7
In both Hernande258 and Williams2"9 the court reaffirmed the proce-
dure that must be followed to preserve error for appeal when the trial court
improperly rejects a defendant's motion to strike a venireman for cause.
The defendant must (1) use a peremptory strike on the venireman he has
unsuccessfully challenged for cause, (2) exhaust his remaining peremptory
strikes on other veniremen, and (3) then file a motion requesting an addi-
tional peremptory challenge for the purpose of striking an additional
named venireman who is unacceptable to the defendant.26° Only if the
trial court refuses to grant an additional peremptory strike is the trial
court's error for having failed to grant defendant's motion to strike for
cause preserved on appeal.
D. Voir Dire-Capital Cases
The Witherspoon rule261 limits exclusion of prospective jurors in a capi-
tal murder case to those "irrevocably committed, before the trial has be-
gun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and
circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings. '262 The
court of criminal appeals consistently asserts that the Witherspoon rule is
alive and well in Texas.2 63 Nevertheless, in light of the court's death pen-
alty decisions during the survey period and earlier, the Wiherspoon rule
253. Id at 292-93.
254. See generaliy 35 TEX. JuR. 2D Jury § 211 (1962).
255. 563 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
256. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
257. 563 S.W.2d at 950.
258. Id at 948.
259. 565 S.W.2d at 65.
260. Beware the different approach to this problem taken by the civil courts. On the civil
side an aggrieved party must move for an additional peremptory strike and name the unac-
ceptable venireman before striking the jury, not afterwards, and failure to do so waives any
error that may have existed by reason of the trial court's rejection of a party's motion to
strike for cause. Carpenter v. Wyatt Constr. Co., 501 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
261. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
262. Id at 522 n.21, quoted in Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976).
263. Whitmore v. State, 570 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc); Cham-
bers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc), cer. denied, 47
U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1979) (No. 78-517); Brock v. State, 556 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex.
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appears to be moribund in Texas and in dire need of resuscitation by the
United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
The court has permitted Texas prosecutors to develop three effective
anti- Witherspoon weapons. The most effective of these is provided by the
court's rule that even if a prospective juror is qualified under Witherspoon,
he is still disqualified to be a juror under section 12.31(b) of the Texas
Penal Code26 if he states that his reservations about the death penalty
would affect his deliberations on the three fact issues submitted to him as
required by article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.265
Section 12.31 (b) provides that "[a] prospective juror shall be disqualified
from serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory
penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations
on any issue of fact."266 At least ten death penalty cases decided during
the survey period involved prospective jurors who may have been quali-
fied under the Witherspoon rule, but who were nevertheless disqualified
under section 12.31(b).2 67
Judge Robert's dissent in Shippy v. State,268 joined by Judge Phillips,
makes a telling rebuttal of the majority position:
It is readily apparent that a person who generally objects to the death
penalty because of conscientious and religious scruples against its in-
fiction will have his determination of fact affected by such belief. But
if such "affectation" does not amount to an unambiguous and irrevo-
cable commitment to vote against the death penalty in all cases, such
individual cannot be constitutionally challenged for cause under
Witherspoon 269
In other words, Texas is excluding Witherspoon qualified prospective ju-
Crim. App.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270, 275 (Tex.
Crim. App.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
264. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974).
265. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN, art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). The Code pro-
vides that if all three of the following questions are answered "yes" unanimously then the
court must sentence the defendant to death:(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in kill-
ing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
Id. art. 37.071(b).
266. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974).
267. See, e.g., Whitmore v. State, 570 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc);
Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc); Chambers v. State, 568
S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc); Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978) (en banc); Hughes v. State, 562 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)(en banc);
Brock v. State, 556 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1002 (1977); Free-
man v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088 (1977); Burns v.
State, 556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); Shippy v. State,
556 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
268. 556 S.W.2d at 257.
269. Id at 262.
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rors for conceding no more than what Witherspoon permits, that they have
reservations about the death penalty that will affect their deliberations of
the three punishment questions, 7° but that they are not irrevocably com-
mitted to answering the questions so as to preclude the death penalty
27
'
regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course
of the proceedings.
In Witherspoon the United States Supreme Court appears to have con-
sidered and rejected the very practice Texas espouses:
It should be understood that much more is involved here than a
simple determination of sentence. For the State of Illinois empowered
the jury in this case to answer "yes" or "no" to the question whether
this defendant was fit to live. To be sure, such a determination is
different in kind from a finding that the defendant committed a speci-
fied criminal offense. Insofar as a determination that a man should be
put to death might require "that there be taken into account the cir-
cumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities
of the offender," . . . for example, it may be appropriate that certain
rules of evidence with respect to penalty should differ from the corre-
sponding evidentiary rules with respect to guilt. . . .But this does not
mean that basic requirements of procedural fairness can be ignored
simply because the determination involved in this case differs in some
respects from the traditional assessment of whether the defendant en-
gaged in a proscribed course of conduct ...
One of those requirements, at least, is that the decision whether a
man deserves to live or die must be made on scales that are not de-
liberatedly tipped toward death.272
When a Texas prosecutor is faced with a prospective juror who passes
muster on both Witherspoon and penal code section 12.31(b) grounds, he
can resort to another anti- Witherspoon procedural weapon tailored to fit
the situation. The prosecutor simply explains to the prospective juror that
if the State fails to prove capital murder, the issue then reverts to the lesser
included offense of murder, which carries a penalty of not less than two
years nor more than life imprisonment. Following this explanation, the
prosecutor can usually elicit expression of bias from the prospective juror
regarding such a short minimum term for so serious a crime as murder. At
this point the prosecutor piously moves that the prospective juror be
striken for cause by reason of Code of Criminal Procedure article
35.16(b)(3), which provides that the State may challenge a prospective ju-
ror "[t]hat has a bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which
the State is entitled to rely for conviction or punishment. 2 7' The court of
criminal appeals will grant the motion to strike for cause 2 74 despite its
270. See note 265 supra.
271. In Brock v. State, 556 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1002
(1977), the court conceded that a jury "will know that their answers will determine whether
the defendant is to be punished by death or by life imprisonment."
272. 391 U.S. at 521 n.20 (citations omitted).
273. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(b)(3) (Vernon 1966).
274. Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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somewhat naive observation that "it is difficult to see why the State would
challenge the prospective juror on the basis stated. 27 5
The State's reason is obvious: it wishes to eliminate Witherspoon quali-
fied prospective jurors, not eliminated under article 12.31 (b), without hav-
ing to use its peremptory challenges to do so. It would appear that
elimination of Witherspoon qualified prospective jurors for cause by the
use of this subterfuge is constitutionally impermissible.276 Obviously the
court does not agree with this conclusion since at least two cases 2 7 7 during
the survey period demonstrate its continued support of the practice.
The third anti- Witherspoon weapon is not as readily available to the
Texas prosecutor since it requires the failure of the defense attorney to
object to the constitutionally improper exclusion of prospective jurors. Yet
once such an oversight occurs, the State can successfully contend that
waiver has occurred. The issue, therefore, cannot be raised on appeal. 8
In his dissent in Shopy Judge Roberts took issue with this rule, con
tending that Davis v. Georgia 80 concerned a Witherspoon qualified pro-
spective juror whose rejection for cause was not made the subject of a
proper objection under Georgia law. The United States Supreme Court,
however, summarily ruled that the improper exclusion of even one Wither-
spoon qualified prospective juror negated any subsequently imposed death
penalty.28' Despite the strength of Judge Robert's argument, a majority of
the court reaffirmed the waiver rule in three cases handed down during the
survey period.28 2
E. Guilt-Innocence Stage-Opening Statement, Evidence, Argument, and
Jury Deliberations
Opening Statement. After the State has rested, Texas procedure permits
a defendant to state the "nature of the defenses relied upon and the facts
expected to be proved in their support. 283 According to Norton v.
State,284 this does not mean that a defendant can make an opening state-
ment when he intends to rest without putting on any evidence. The de-
fendant's contention in Norton that article 36.01, subdivision 5, allows a
defense attorney to assert that a defendant is pleading not guilty, and is
content to rely on the facts presented by the State was rejected as being
275. Id. at 670.
276. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976).
277. Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344, 348-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc); Cham-
bers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
278. Bulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677,682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
959 (1977).
279. 556 S.W.2d at 257.
280. 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
281. Id
282. Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc); Hughes v.
State, 562 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc); Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246
(Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
283. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.01(5) (Vernon 1966).




Evidence. Three decisions of the court of criminal appeals concerning ev-
idence in criminal cases merit comment. Most significant was Stuart v.
State,286 a five-to-three decision287 wherein the court held that even where
evidence of prior criminal conduct would otherwise be admissible under
an exception to the rule against admission of extraneous offenses, the
double jeopardy clause precludes such use of the evidence where the prior
conduct was the subject of a criminal trial that ended in an acquittal.
Stuart was a rape case and under the common scheme and design excep-
tion to the rule against admission of extraneous offenses, the State was
permitted to introduce evidence of a prior rape even though defendant was
acquitted on the previous rape charge. The majority reversed the convic-
tion and remanded the case, concluding "that any application of an excep-
tion to the rule against admission of extraneous offenses . . . must
necessarily be to an occurrence which has not already been conclusively
established by a verdict of acquittal to have not been an extraneous offense
in the first place.' 288 In reaching this conclusion, the majority adopted the
persuasive reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, which expanded the Ashe v.
Swenson289 application of collateral estoppel as a part of the double jeop-
ardy prohibition to include evidentiary as well as ultimate fact issues290 on
the rationale that "otherwise a person could never remove himself from
the blight and suspicious aura which surround an accusation that he is
guilty of a specific crime. "291
Judge Douglas, writing for the dissent in Stuart, argued that Ashe
should be read to permit the reuse of evidentiary facts rather than to pre-
clude such use, and the Fifth Circuit, therefore, had "erroneously ex-
panded the Ashe decision 'beyond double jeopardy, beyond collateral
estoppel, and beyond ultimate fact to bar the use of probative evidence
about a wholly separate event.' "292
The problem of "have you heard" cross-examination of a defendant's
reputation witness was given consideration by the court in Moffett v.
State.2 93 A vacillating three-to-two majority finally concluded that the
following cross-examination question was proper: "Have you heard that
on September the 18th of 1973, that he robbed a woman by the name of
Francis Tindall at the Globe Cleaners at 2403 North Haskell Avenue with
a firearm?, 29 4 The general rule in Texas is that a prosecutor may ask a
285. Id at 718.
286. 561 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
287. Judge Vollers did not participate.
288. 561 S.W.2d at 182.
289. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
290. Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1975); Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d
209 (5th Cir. 1972).
291. Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1972).
292. 561 S.W.2d at 184.
293. 555 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
294. Id at 440.
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character witness if he has heard of a specific act of misconduct, but he
may not ask whether the witness had personal knowledge of the act, nor
may the question be framed so as to imply that the act has actually been
committed.295 The majority pointed out that mere inclusion of details in a
"have you heard" question does not in and of itself create an implication
of fact, and that in the instant case the details were not so excessive as to
imply that the act had actually been committed.2 96 The dissent, of course,
argued that the details in the question were so excessive as to clearly imply
that the act had actually occurred.29 7
Since reputation evidence is based on hearsay, it could be logically ar-
gued that the State should be permitted to ask the defendant's reputation
witness whether he has heard anything inconsistent with his opinion.29 8
To permit the inclusion of any specific details in a "have you heard" ques-
tion, however, does not seem logical since any details at all imply that the
act inquired about has actually been committed.
Finally, in Bright v. State2 99 the court ruled that it makes no difference
in questioning a reputation witness whether one asks him about a defend-
ant's "reputation" in the community or his "general reputation" in the
community; the terms are interchangeable. The Bright decision overrules
Edwards v. State,3° which required that the inquiry be made as to "gen-
eral reputation."
Argument. In Villalobos v. State3° ' a twenty-five-year murder conviction
was reversed and remanded because the prosecutor asserted to the jury
during argument at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial: "I believe [de-
fendant] is just as guilty as he can possibly be."3 °2 The trial court over-
ruled the objection of defendant's attorney and the appellate court
reversed. It is inexcusable for a prosecutor to inject his personal opinion,
particularly when it is so easy to use qualifying remarks such as "I think
the evidence shows" or "under the evidence."
In Jones v. State30 3 the prosecutor argued during the punishment stage
that the jurors "should, in deliberating as to punishment, discuss how long
the defendants would be required to serve in order to satisfy the sentence
imposed.,, 3 ' He then added that, based on his experience, if the jurors did
not assess seven to ten years "it won't mean anything. 3 5 Defendant's
objection was overruled. The conviction was reversed on appeal since it
295. Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
296. 555 S.W.2d at 442.
297. Id. at 439.
298. Id at 440.
299. 556 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
300. 91 Tex. Crim. 196, 237 S.W.933 (1922).
301. 568 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
302. Id at 134.
303. 564 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Crim. App 1978).
304. Id at 720.
305. Id
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was clearly error for the prosecutor to discuss the matter of parole and
urge the jury to consider it in assessing punishment.
Jury Deliberations. Edwards v. State3 6 holds that if a trial court persists
in giving oral instructions to the jury relative to the cause over the timely
objection of the defendant, reversible error is the automatic result. Once a
jury has retired to deliberate, any communication by the jury to the trial
court relative to the cause must be in writing, and the court must answer
any such communication in writing.3°7 In Edwards the jury sent out a note
stating, "We are hung."3 °8 Defendant promptly moved for a mistrial, and
when his motion was denied, he objected to any oral instructions to the
jury. Nevertheless, the trial court gave oral instructions to the jury pertain-
ing to the need for renewed effort on the part of the jurors to resolve their
differences. 3 9 Defendant's conviction was reversed on appeal without his
having to show harm since, upon timely objection, the article 36.27 re-
quirement that additional instructions to the jury be in writing is
mandatory.31i Otherwise defendant would be denied his right to examine
the additional instructions and urge any objections he might have.
In Skillern v. State31' a death penalty conviction was reversed because
the trial court permitted the jury to separate after the charge was read to
the jury at the guilt stage of the trial and also after the State's opening
argument, over the objection of defendant's counsel. When such a separa-
tion occurs in violation of article 35.23,312 harm is presumed unless the
State rebuts such presumption. In Skillern the district attorney made no
effort to offer rebuttal evidence since both he and the trial judge were
under the erroneous impression that the burden was on defendant to show
harm.313
F. Punishment Stage-Evidence and Enhancement
Evidence. At the punishment stage of a trial, whether before a judge or a
jury, evidence may be offered as to a defendant's prior criminal record
including "any final conviction material to the offense charged. '' 314 In a
case of first impression, Chestnut v. State,3" 5 the court concluded that this
provision of article 37.07, section 3(a) includes conviction in justice courts
and municipal courts, that is, courts not of record.
Chestnut was found guilty of aggravated robbery at the guilt-innocence
stage of his trial. During the punishment stage the State introduced evi-
dence of two municipal court convictions for simple assault. The trial
306. 558 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
307. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.27 (Vernon 1966).
308. 558 S.W.2d at 452.
309. Id at 453.
310. Id at 454.
311. 559 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
312. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.23 (Vernon 1966).
313. 559 S.W.2d at 833.
314. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
315. 567 S.W.2d I (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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court sentenced Chestnut to twenty years. On appeal the court of criminal
appeals concluded that because the simple assault convictions were for
physical violence against the person, they were material to defendant's cur-
rent crime of aggravated robbery, which also involved the security of the
person.316
Enhancement. In Texas life imprisonment is mandatory upon a third
conviction for any felony.317 Although Penal Code section 12.42(d) does
not on its face violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment, a Fifth Circuit panel in Rummel v. Estelle" 8 ruled that
the inflexible application of life imprisonment in a given case can consti-
tute a punishment so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime
as to become cruel and unusual punishment by reason of length alone.
The decision is under en banc review at the present time.319
The majority in Rummel applied the Fourth Circuit test for determining
whether a particular application of a mandatory state enhancement statute
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment by reason of punishment length
alone.32° Under this test a court considers cumulatively (1) the nature of
the offense, (2) the legislative purpose behind the punishment, (3) the pun-
ishment that the defendant would have received in other jurisdictions, and
(4) the punishment meted out for other offenses in the same jurisdiction.32'
Rummel received an enhanced sentence of life imprisonment in 1973 for
the then felony offense of obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses.322 His
punishment was enhanced on the strength of a 1964 felony conviction of
presenting a credit card with intent to commit an $80 fraud, and a 1969
felony conviction for passing a forged instrument with a face value of
$28.36. The majority assessed defendant's sentence in light of the Fourth
Circuit factors and concluded that imposing a life sentence for these three
crimes was indeed so grossly disproportionate to the offenses as to consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment.323 In reaching this conclusion, the
majority observed that Texas imposed dramatically lower minimum pen-
alties for crimes of violence, and that "Texas now stands virtually alone in
its unqualified demand for life imprisonment for a three-time felon even
316. Id at 2.
317. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
318. 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing en banc granted (1978).
319. After the survey period ended the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc, in a closely divided
opinion, held that there was no violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). The en banc
majority appears to base its decision on the proposition that Rummel's life sentence is not in
fact a life sentence because of Texas good time credit system and the possibility of parole.
The dissent, which was the panel majority, responded that if Rummel has a constitutional
right to interdict his prison term, then the court had to declare the existence of the right
without regard to the possibility that Texas, by an act of executive grace, might grant him
parole. The office of Scott J. Atlas, court-appointed attorney for Rummel, advised on Jan.
31, 1979, that application for writ of certiorari would be filed.
320. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
321. 568 F.2d at 1197.
322. Id. at 1195.
323. Id at 1200.
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where his convictions were for minor property crimes involving neither
violence nor a remote possibility of violence.3 2
4
In Boule P. State325 the court of criminal appeals held a prosecutor's
vindictive use of enhancement allegations on retrial to retaliate for defend-
ant's prior exercise of his right of appeal violated due process. At the first
trial Bouie pled guilty to robbery by assault and received ten years; he
appealed and obtained a reversal. Subsequently, he was reindicted for the
same crime and the new indictment alleged two prior felony convictions
for enhancement. Defendant again pled guilty, but pled not true to the
enhancement allegations. Finding the allegations true, the trial court was
required to fix punishment at life.
On appeal the judgment of conviction was affirmed, but the punishment
was set aside and the case remanded for dismissal of the enhancement
allegations in the indictment, with proper punishment to be assessed in
accordance with the principles of North Carolina v. Pearce.32 6 Pearce
teaches that when a defendant has made a successful appellate attack on
his first conviction, vindictiveness must not play a part in any sentence the
defendant receives after a retrial.3 27 This due process prohibition applies
to prosecutors as well as to judges.328 Further, once a defendant enters the
same plea on retrial, use of the enhancement statute to increase punish-
ment raises a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness that can be dis-
pelled only if the State meets its burden of showing for the record that it
had objective information concerning identifiable conduct of the defend-
ant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.3 29 In
Boule not only did the prosecutor fail to make such a record, he admitted
that he did not base the enhanced indictment on any interim conduct of
defendant.33 °
Two other decisions concerning punishment enhancement should be
noted. In Joles v. State33" ' the court emphasized once again that, "unlike
the rule that a prior conviction too remote in time cannot be used for im-
peachment purposes, a prior conviction may be utilized for enhancement
no matter how remote." In Thompson P. State33 2 the court held that proof
of a prior felony conviction during the punishment stage for enhancement
purposes could be made by the testimony of a district clerk and a district
attorney, absent any objection from the defendant. The court explained
that the defendant could have objected on "best evidence" grounds and
compelled the State to prove the prior conviction by introduction of the
indictment and the authenticated copies of the judgment and sentence.333
324. Id
325. 565 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
326. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
327. Id. at 725.
328. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
329. 565 S.W.2d at 546.
330. Id at 546-47.
331. 563 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
332. 563 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
333. Id at 251.
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G. Punishment Stage-Capital Murder
Psychiatric Testimony on Dangerousness. Article 37.071 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure334 states that before a defendant can be given a death
sentence, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that "there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society. 335 With some frequency,
Texas prosecutors refer incarcerated capital murder defendants for exami-
nation by psychiatrists readily prepared to diagnose the accused as an anti-
social personality (sociopath)336 who would be an absolute threat to
society. 337 As might be expected, such testimony at the punishment stage
of a capital murder trial often results in a death sentence under article
37.071.
If Smith v. Estelle,338 a recent federal district court decision in a habeas
corpus case, is not reversed, use of this prosecutorial tactic may be sharply
curtailed, if not eliminated. The Smith court concluded that the due proc-
ess clause requires that "when the state introduces psychiatric testimony on
dangerousness at the punishment phase of a capital trial the defense must
have a fair opportunity to cross examine that testimony and rebut it with
expert testimony on behalf of the defendant.3a39 In order to insure this,
the court further held that "defense counsel must be notified that a psychi-
* atric examination will be held on the issue of 'dangerousness' the results of
which may be used at the penalty phase of the trial."34 Prior to trial,
defense counsel must have meaningful access to the psychiatrist's statuto-
rily required report.34' The trial judge can appoint a psychiatrist if he
wishes, but the testimony and report of a court-appointed psychiatrist
would be equally available to both defense and prosecution, and both sides
have the right to obtain additional psychiatric experts either to supplement
or challenge the conclusions of the court-appointed psychiatrist.342
The most significant part of the court's opinion, however, is its holding
that in the future, whenever the State or trial court seeks to have a defend-
ant examined by a psychiatric expert on the issue of dangerousness, de-
334. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
335. Id. art. 37.07 1(b)(2).
336. The AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1968), defines an antisocial personality as that of individuals
who are basically unsocialized and whose behavior pattern brings them re-
peatedly into conflict with society. They are incapable of significant loyalty to
individuals, groups, or social values. They are grossly selfish, callous, irre-
sponsible, impulsive and unable to feel guilt or to learn from experience and
punishment. Frustration tolerance is low. They tend to blame others or offer
plausible rationalizations for their behavior. A mere history of repeated legal
or social offenses is not sufficient to justify this diagnosis.
337. See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
338. 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977), appealpending, No. 78-1839. The office of attor-
neyJohn F. Simmons stated that oral argument was heard in the Fifth Circuit on Feb. 8,






fendant must be advised that he has a fifth amendment right to remain
silent.343 In reaching this conclusion, the federal district court reasoned
that, unlike psychiatric examinations on crime-time insanity or compe-
tency to stand trial, a compelled psychiatric examination on the issue of
"dangerousness" involves "not only the way the Defendant communicates
to the psychiatrist, but also the content of what he says that forms the basis
of the expert opinion."' 3 " Consequently, if a defendant, upon advise of
counsel, elects to remain silent, "he may not be questioned by the psychia-
trist for the purpose of determining dangerousness. 345 Of course, a de-
fendant can waive his right to remain silent by initiating a psychiatric
examination on the issue of dangerousness or by seeking to introduce testi-
mony on the issue, in which event "he can not hide behind his privilege
...when the court or the prosecutor seek to have him examined by an
additional psychiatrist, or when the prosecutor attempts to introduce the
testimony by the Defendant's expert, or its own expert at the punishment
phase. ' 3 1
A somewhat unique waiver problem was also addressed by the Smith
court. If a defendant raises a crime-time insanity defense or a competency
issue at the guilt stage of a trial, but is nevertheless found guilty or compe-
tent, he may have the jury at the punishment stage consider his psychiatric
evidence on insanity as a mitigating factor.347 He waives his privilege
against self-incrimination if he follows this course, and the State may have
a psychiatrist examine the defendant on the issue of dangerousness and
introduce testimony on the issue before the jury.3 48 Should he elect not to
have the insanity evidence considered for mitigation purposes at the pun-
ishment stage, the jury will then be so instructed and the fifth amendment
will foreclose either a compelled psychiatric examination on dangerous-
ness or evidence from a court-appointed or State psychiatrist on danger-
ousness learned from a sanity or competency examination.349
Evidence Admissible at the Punishment Stage. The court of criminal ap-
peals made it clear in Exparte Granvie35° that article 37.171 permits virtu-
ally any evidence relevant to the two or possibly three statutory special
issues submitted at the punishment stage, including mitigating or aggravat-
ing circumstances. 35' This is particularly important since Jurek v.
Texas352 holds that the constitutionality of the Texas death penalty stat-
ute353 rests upon the opportunity given a defendant to present mitigating
343. Id at 659.
344. Id at 662.
345. Id at 664.
346. Id at 663.
347. Id at 664.
348. Id
349. Id
350. 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
351. Id at 516.
352. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
353. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
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circumstances at the punishment stage. Any curtailment of this opportu-
nity, or suppression of such evidence renders a resulting death penalty un-
constitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment.354 In this regard, the jury may properly consider all the evi-
dence adduced during the guilt stage of the trial, including evidence of
defendant's mental condition.355
Circumstantial Evidence Charge. It is easy to understand why a defendant
would want a circumstantial evidence charge anytime he could obtain one
because of its references to "moral certainty." '356 It does not appear, how-
ever, that such a charge is applicable to the punishment stage issues of
Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.07 1.3 5  Bodde v. State358 and
Shippy v. State359 are the cases so holding and their reasoning seems
sound.
Even at the guilt stage of a trial, a circumstantial evidence charge is
required only when circumstantial evidence is used to prove the culpable
act, which is a matter of historical fact. In comparison, the charge is not
given with regard to a circumstantially proven matter of internal psycho-
logical fact such as mens rea.360 Thus, the court reasoned that a circum-
stantial evidence charge is not applicable at the punishment stage because
the jury's evaluation of circumstantial evidence to determine matters of
internal psychological fact as they pertain to a defendant are involved.36 1
Life Imprisonment. Once again the court in Duffy v. State362 rejected an
argument that it is an unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof to
require a defendant to obtain a ten-to-two "no" vote on the special capital
punishment issues of article 37.07 1363 before he will be entitled to life im-
prisonment rather than death. The court reasoned that in order to get an
acquittal rather than a hung jury at the trial stage, a defendant must re-
ceive twelve favorable votes. At the punishment stage "the procedure is
the same with the exception that if a defendant has ten votes he receives a
favorable verdict instead of a hung jury.",3 1
An argument can be made that the defendant has the burden of proof on
the question whether he will receive life imprisonment should the State fail
in its bid for the death sentence. The real question, however, is not the
validity of the court's reasoning, but why the legislature has not yet
354. Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647, 658 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
355. 561 S.W.2d at 516.
356. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 0.01 (1975).
357. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
358. 568 S.W.2d 344, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
359. 556 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
360. 568 S.W.2d at 351.
361. Id Although Bodde and Shippy do not concern special issue (3) of art. 37.071
(whether defendant's killing the deceased was an unreasonable response to provocation), the
reasoning of the cases appears equally applicable to this issue.
362. 567 S.W.2d 197, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
363. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
364. 567 S.W.2d at 204.
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amended article 37.071 so that life imprisonment would be automatic upon
failure of the State to obtain a death sentence. Retrial of the whole case,
guilt stage and punishment stage, because a jury can neither agree unani-
mously on death nor at least ten-to-two on life imprisonment, simply does
not make sense.
Execution by Intravenous Injection of a Lethal Substance. On May 11,
1977, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 43.14 was amended to
provide that "the sentence of death . . . shall be executed . . . by intrave-
nous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to
cause death . . . .such execution procedure to be determined and super-
vised by the Director of the Department of Corrections." '365 Just a day
earlier Oklahoma became the first jurisdiction to provide for execution by
lethal injection with its enactment of a statute requiring that the "punish-
ment of death must be inflicted by continuous, intravenous administration
of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combination with
a chemical paralytic agent until death is pronounced by a licensed physi-
cian according to accepted standards of medical practice.,
366
Although the weakness of the Texas statute becomes apparent when
compared with its Oklahoma counterpart, it withstood attacks on various
constitutional grounds in Exparte Granviel.3 67 The court properly rejected
defendant's contentions of cruel and unusual punishment 368 and ex post
facto legislation;369 however, its rejection of defendant's void for vagueness
and unconstitutional delegation of legislative power contentions is ques-
tionable.
Granviel asserted that article 43.14 was unconstitutionally vague and in-
definite because of its failure to specify the type of lethal substance to be
used in the injection,370 and because the director of the department of cor-
rections is left free to choose both the lethal substance and the manner in
which the intravenous injection will take place.371' Although the court
seemed to recognize the need for a more precise statute,37 z it rejected de-
fendant's vagueness argument because the "context of the statute is a pub-
lic statement of the general manner of execution," and "[iun this sense the
statute is sufficiently definite." 37' A strong argument can be made against
the court's position.
The eighth amendment provision against cruel and unusual punishment
prohibits any method of execution calculated to cause unnecessary pain or
365. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14 (Vernon 1979).
366. 1977 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 41, § 1, at 89.
367. 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
368. Id at 508-10.
369. Id at 510-11.
370. Id at 511.





a lingering death.374 Nowhere in the language of article 43.14 is there any
hint of a statutory standard requiring that any lethal substance used must
act as quickly and as painlessly as possible. Any statute, such as article
43.14, that does not provide explicit or at least implied standards for those
who apply it is void for vagueness under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 375 Due process requires this particular void for
vagueness rule; otherwise, the individual or individuals obligated or ap-
pointed to enforce a vague law would be free to enforce it in an arbitrary
and discriminatory manner.376 For example, there are no standards in ar-
ticle 43.14, either expressed or implied, to govern the director of the de-
partment of corrections in his exercise of the discretion granted by the
article; thus, absent the void for vagueness rule, he is free to arbitrarily
choose a lethal substance that would cause an agonizing death and result
in the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, just as defendant as-
serted in Granviel.377
While the court cited several older cases from various jurisdictions in
support of its position,378 it can be argued that they no longer have validity
in light of the modem void for vagueness rule.379 The unconstitutional
vagueness of article 43.14 is not cured by the presumption of the court of
criminal appeals that the director will select a quick-acting, painless lethal
substance and thus avoid the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
Assurance that the termination of a human life by the State will be carried
out humanely, that is, quickly and with as little pain as possible, should
not, cannot, and does not depend on a presumption that the director will
do the right thing-even though the possibility of arbitrary or otherwise
improper conduct is extremely remote.
If article 43.14 is void for vagueness, it would still be void even without
the clause specifically delegating execution authority to the director. This
is so because the statute does not provide for expressed or implied mini-
mum standards of humaneness to guide whoever would be called upon to
enforce the statute. Thus, article 43.14 is not rendered any less vague or
any less void by the incorporation into the statute of a clause delegating to
a specific state official the unfettered power to enforce the vague law in
whatever manner he may deem appropriate. In fact, the statute's vague-
ness is compounded by the clause.
The defendant in Granviel also asserted article 43.14 to be an invalid
delegation of legislative power in violation of Texas Constitution article II,
374. Cf Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to a prisoner's
serious medical needs held to be cruel and unusual punishment).
375. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
376. 408 U.S. at 108-09.
377. 561 S.W.2d at 513.
378. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (considering a Utah territorial statute); Peo-
ple v. Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 256 P.2d 911 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953); State
v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 211 P. 676 (1923).
379. See authorities cited at note 375 supra.
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section L" The court rejected this contention, stating that when the legis-
lature amended article 43.14 to provide a new mode of execution by injec-
tion of a lethal substance, it declared a policy and fixed a primary
standard. Thus, delegation of authority to the director to determine execu-
tion procedures was merely the delegation of power to determine details,
not the delegation of any legislative power.381 The court's conclusion does
not appear to be correct.
True enough, if the legislature has prescribed sufficient standards to
guide the discretion conferred, then the power is not legislative and the
delegation is lawful.382 But in fact, article 43.14 contains no standard re-
quiring that any lethal substance selected by the director must act as quick-
ly and as painlessly as possible, as mandated by the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition of the eighth amendment. With no primary stan-
dard for humane executions in the statute, the delegation clause necessar-
ily vests the director with an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion
regarding the conduct of executions. This is clearly a delegation of legisla-
tive power in violation of article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution.383
Where an execution officer, such as the director of the department of cor-
rections, is charged with the administration of a statute, the legislature
must prescribe a standard for his guidance and must not vest him with
arbitrary or uncontrolled discretion.3 84
V. SENTENCING AND POST-TRIAL
A. Sentencing and Presentence Reports
Validity of Sentence. Because some trial courts continue to overlook the
fact that punishment must be assessed and judgment rendered before sen-
tence can be pronounced, the court of criminal appeals in Bean v. State3 5
carefully described the sequence of steps that must be followed in order for
a sentence to be valid. Whenever the trial court is called upon to assess
punishment, it must conduct a hearing with the defendant and counsel
present wherein appropriate evidence is considered, and, after which, the
trial court will assess a definite punishment. Judgment is then rendered
pursuant to article 42.01, that is, the judgment shall include a declaration
of the court that the defendant will be punished as has been determined. 386
380. TEX. CONST. art. II, § I provides for division of power between three separate de-
partments: legislature, executive, and judiciary. It further provides: "[N]o person, or collec-
tion of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly
attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted."
381. 561 S.W.2d at 515.
382. In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
383. Id; Moody v. City of University Park, 278 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); State v. Society for Friendless Children, 102 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ.
App-Austin), rev'don other grounds, 130 Tex. 533, 111 S.W.2d 1075 (1907).
384. In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d at 781. See also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 138 n.12
(1956).
385. 563 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
386. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.01 (Vernon 1979).
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As stated in article 42.03, section 1,387 the trial court should then allow the
defendant time to file a motion for new trial under article 40.05388 or a
motion in arrest of judgment under articles 41.01-.02389 unless such time is
waived. After said time has expired or been waived, the trial court should
pronounce sentence in accordance with article 42.02.390
Presentence Reports. Judge Onion's concurring opinion in Bean v.
State39 1 contains a significant reminder for all trial courts about the nature
and purpose of presentence reports. He points out that presentence reports
must be used only to pass on the issue of probation. Because "[tihese re-
ports frequently contain hearsay, information concerning inadmissible ex-
traneous offenses, and other matters that would not be admissible at trial,"
they must not be used to determine the punishment to be assessed.3 92
Judge Onion explains that whenever a court defers the assessment of
punishment in a case where probation is a possibility and resets the case
for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation, there is a real
danger of presentence reports improperly being used to determine punish-
ment. For this reason, he suggests that whenever it becomes the duty of a
trial court to assess punishment, either after a jury finding of guilt where
the defendant has elected to have the court determine punishment, or upon
a guilty plea, the court should immediately conduct a punishment hearing.
Once punishment has been assessed, it will be clear that the subsequently
prepared presentence report was used only to pass on the issue of proba-
tion.393
In Burns v. State394 the court reminded defense attorneys that although
defendants now have the right under article 42.12, section 4395 to see a
presentence report prior to the trial court's determination of the probation
issue, a probation officer need not provide the report absent a request from
the defendant or his attorney.
B. Appeal
Waiver of Right to Appeal. In Texas a defendant has the right to appeal a
conviction at his election 396 with two exceptions: (1) a death sentence is
automatically appealed;397 and (2) a defendant cannot appeal a plea bar-
gained conviction without the permission of the trial court.398 During the
survey period the court of criminal appeals appears to have settled on the
387. Id art. 42.03, § 1.
388. Id art. 40.05.
389. Id arts. 41.01-.02.
390. Id art. 42.02.
391. 563 S.W.2d at 821.
392. Id
393. Id at 822.
394. 561 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
395. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 42.12, § 4 (Vernon 1979).
396. Id art. 44.02.
397. Id art. 37.071(f) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
398. Id art. 44.02 (Vernon 1979).
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procedure to be followed when an appeal is attempted after a waiver. A
defendant may waive his right to appeal, and once having done so he can-
not thereafter appeal unless (1) he obtains the consent of the trial court, 3 9 9
or (2) he can show that his waiver was not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily given.'
If, after an alleged waiver, a defendant goes ahead and files notice of
appeal within ten days after sentence is pronounced, he should include in
the notice allegations of fact that, if proved, would show the waiver was
coerced or involuntary.4' The trial court should conduct a hearing on the
allegations and if the trial court rules against the defendant, the matter is
forwarded to the court of criminal appeals for a final determination of the
issue.40 1 After an alleged waiver, if the defendant does not file a notice of
appeal within the ten-day period, he is relegated to filing a post-conviction
writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, which again must contain allega-
tions of fact that, if proved, would show the waiver was coerced or invol-
untary.4 °3
Trial Courts' Duty to Indigent Defendants. Effective May 25, 1977, article
40.09 was amended to transfer from the trial courts to the court of criminal
appeals the authority to grant extension of time for filing a transcript of the
court reporter's notes and for filing appellate briefs.' Since some trial
judges misconceived the change in article 40.09 to mean that they no
longer had authority to see that such items are filed, the court went to some
lengths in three different cases to impress upon the trial courts their contin-
uing constitutional duty to see that indigent defendants receive effective
assistance of counsel and an adequate record on appeal." 5 In one of these
cases, Guillory v. State,4" the court left no doubt regarding a trial court's
duty by stating that court reporters who persist in not preparing and filing
a transcription of their notes in indigent cases should be held in contempt,
and, if necessary, fired. Addressing the problem of attorneys who fail to
file an appellate brief on behalf of their indigent clients, the court sug-
gested contempt proceedings, a report to the appropriate grievance com-
mittee, and the preclusion of further court appointments for indigent
clients.
Sentence Limitfor Bail on Appeal. Although article 44.04 was amended
in various ways effective August 29, 1977, the fifteen-year sentence limit
provision regarding bail pending appeal remained the same." Section 4
399. Johnson v. State, 556 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
400. Exparne Hogan, 556 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
401. Id
402. See Johnson v. State, 556 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
403. Ex Parte Hogan, 556 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. [977).
404. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09, § 16 (Vernon 1979).
405. Bush v. State, 557 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Guillory v. State, 557
S.W.2d 118, 120-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Yates v. State, 557 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977).
406. 557 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
407. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04(b) (Vernon 1979).
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of article 42.09,408 also amended August 29, 1977, specifies that a defend-
ant sentenced to a term of more than ten years who gives notice of appeal
is to be transferred to the department of corrections on a commitment
pending a mandate from the court of criminal appeals. In 1978, the court
of criminal appeals resolved this apparent conflict.
In Exparte Briones4° the defendant was convicted of robbery on Octo-
ber 3, 1977, and assessed punishment at thirteen years. The trial court
refused bail because of article 42.09, section 4. Defendant sought relief by
writ of habeas corpus. The court ruled the conflict between articles 44.04
and 42.09 to be only apparent, not actual, and held that defendant was
entitled to bail under the fifteen-year provision of article 44.04(b). Utiliz-
ing the construction aids in section 3.03 of the Code Construction Act 410 as
a guide, the court presumed that the legislature intended both amendments
be given effect and attempted to construe them to produce harmony rather
than conflict. The Briones court did this by construing article 42.09 as ad-
dressing only the manner of delivery of a defendant for confinement, and
article 44.04(c) as controlling the determination of whether to confine a
defendant.4
Order Granting a Conditional Discharge and Probation on Violations of the
Texas Controlled Substances Act. In George v. State4 12 defendant was
convicted of possession of methaqualone, a Class A misdemeanor. Since it
was his first offense, the court entered an order granting a conditional dis-
charge and placing defendant on probation for a year, all as prescribed by
section 4.12 of the Texas Controlled Substances Act.4t3
Defendant gave notice of appeal, but it was dismissed by the court of
criminal appeals because, unlike the provisions of article 42.12414 and arti-
cle 42.134.5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 4.12 of the Texas
Controlled Substances Act has no provision for appealing an order grant-
ing a conditional discharge. The court of criminal appeals noted that the
case could not be appealed as a criminal conviction because in granting a
conditional discharge, the trial court does not enter a judgment of guilt.4 6
Thus, a first offender charged with a violation of the Texas Controlled
Substances Act who plans an appeal if convicted, should seek a conviction
and probation under either articles 42.12 or 42.13 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure rather than a conditional discharge and probation under section
4.12 of the Texas Controlled Substances Act because under it, there is no
way to appeal.
408. Id art. 42.09, § 4.
409. 563 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
410. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-2 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
411. 563 S.W.2d at 273.
412. 557 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
413. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.12 (Vernon 1976).
414. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (Vernon 1979).
415. Id art. 42.13.
416. 557 S.W.2d at 788.
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C. Probation and Revocation
Probation-Consideration of Defendant's Arrest Record, Juvenile Record,
and Hearsay Regarding Defendant's Social History and Present Condi-
tion. When a trial judge, rather than a jury, determines whether proba-
tion should be granted, according to article 42.12, section 4 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure,41 7 the judge may consider defendant's arrest rec-
ord,418 including juvenile arrests, 4 19 and hearsay42° pertaining to the de-
fendant's social history and present condition. This varied information
may come to the attention of the trial court under its article 42.12, section 4
power to order the preparation of a presentence report by a probation of-
ficer. If a jury considers probation in conjunction with a determination of
punishment, it is limited by Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.07, sec-
tion 3(a)42 to consideration of general reputation and character along with
any final convictions on defendant's record, including final convictions in
nonrecord courts, such as municipal courts and justice of the peace courts,
if such nonrecord court convictions are material to the offense charged.422
That some confusion still exists among the defense bar regarding this
distinction is indicated by Pitts v. State,423 wherein the defendant con-
tended that the trial court violated article 37.07, section 3(a) by considering
defendant's previous arrest record, including juvenile arrests, in its deter-
mination to reject the defendant's application for probation. The court of
criminal appeals, of course, rejected the defendant's contention.424 Trial
judges are reminded, however, that presentence report hearsay, including a
defendant's arrest record, can only be used in passing on the issue of pro-
bation, not on the issue of punishment. 25 Also, presentence reports must
now be made available to the defendant upon request before the probation
issue is decided, so that the defendant may have an opportunity to point
out any inaccuracies in the report.426
Restitution for Loss Caused by Offense Charged as Condition for Granting
Probation. Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.12, section 6 prescribes
as a permissible probation condition the requirement that defendant
"make restitution or reparation in any sum that the court shall deter-
mine. "427 This probation prerequisite withstood constitutional attack in
Thompson v. State. 428 Thompson was convicted of failing to stop and
render aid. After his car hit the pedestrian victim, defendant drove on,
417. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 4 (Vernon 1979).
418. McNeese v. State, 468 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
419. Walker v. State, 493 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
420. Brown v. State, 478 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
421. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
422. See note 315 supra.
423. 560 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
424. Id at 692.
425. See notes 391-93 supra.
426. See notes 395 & 394 supra.
427. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 6 (Vernon 1979).
428. 557 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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dragging the victim a considerable distance and causing the victim inju-
ries.42 9 Defendant pled guilty. The trial court assessed punishment at five
years and placed defendant on probation subject to payment of $12,000
restitution to the victim at the rate of $200 per month.
On appeal the court said there was no due process violation where resti-
tution was limited, as here, to loss caused by the offense for which defend-
ant was convicted.43° In this regard, the court was careful to point out the
trial court's power to set restitution in keeping with defendant's ability to
pay and to adjust the payment schedule whenever fluctuations in that abil-
ity to pay might occur.43 1 The court specifically raised, but left unan-
swered, the question whether it would be a denial of due process or
otherwise unconstitutional for a trial court to require restitution for inju-
ries unrelated to the offense as a condition to receiving probation. 32 The
defendant also asserted that making restitution a prerequisite to the grant-
ing of probation constituted imprisonment for debt in violation of article I,
section 18 of the Texas Constitution. This was easily rejected by the court
with the explanation that any imprisonment would be punishment for vio-
lation of the criminal law, not for debt.433
The case was remanded for a hearing to determine the amount of resti-
tution to be ordered because of the State's failure to put on evidence of the
amount of damages suffered by the victim. The court of criminal appeals
was silent regarding the elements of damage that might be considered by
the trial court, but did quote a definition of restitution as including the "act
of making good or giving equivalent for any loss, damage or injury; and
indemnification." '434 This language appears broad enough to encompass
any of the traditionally recognized elements of damage for personal inju-
ries. The court's decision in Thompson is in keeping with decisions of most
other jurisdictions that have considered the question.435
Probable Cause Preliminary Hearings Upon Arrest of ,41leged Probation Vi-
olator. The probationer in Whisenant v. State436 contended that, by rea-
son of Gagnon v. Scarpeli4 37 and Morrissey v. Brewer,438 he was absolutely
entitled to a preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and detention to
determine whether there was probable cause to believe that he had com-
mitted a violation of his probation. Although this is the precise holding of
Mforrissey439 and Gagnon,' 0 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in
Whisenant rejected the preliminary hearing requirement, citing several
429. Id. at 524.
430. Id
431. Id. at 525.
432. Id at 523.
433. Id at 525.
434. Id (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (4th rev. ed. 1968)).
435. See Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 976 (1977).
436. 557 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
437. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
438. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
439. Id at 485.
440. 411 U.S. at 781-82.
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reasons, none of which are sufficiently on point to even merit extended
discussion. For example, the court asserted that there is no reason for a
preliminary probable cause hearing because article 42.12, section 8(a)" of
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an arrested probationer not
released on bail may move for a hearing on the merits of the State's mo-
tion to revoke, which must be heard within twenty days or dismissed. 442
The specific holding in Gagnon is that a probationer
is entitled to two hearings, one a preliminary hearing at a time of his
arrest and detention to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that he has committed a violation of his [probation], and the
other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior to the making of
the final revocation decision." 3
Thus, the holding of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Whisenant
appears to be clearly erroneous.
Probation Revocation Hearing-Judicial Notice of Testimony Offered at
Prior Trial to Prove Commission of Offense Made the Basis of Motion to
Revoke. A divided court of criminal appeals sitting en banc in Bradley v.
State444 gave continued life to the rule that a trial judge in a probation
revocation hearing may take judicial notice of testimony offered at a prior
trial at which he also presided to prove commission of the offense made the
basis of the State's motion to revoke.
The majority qualified the ruling by requiring the State, in the event of
an appeal of the revocation decision, to ensure that the record of the j udi-
cally noticed testimony is before the appellate court either as a part of the
revocation appeal or as a part of the appellate record in the trial of the
crime on which the revocation of probation is based." 5 The appeal in
Bradley was abated because the State had failed to do this." 6
Presiding Judge Onion and Judges Dally and Phillips dissented because
they did not believe that testimony in another proceeding was the proper
subject of judicial knowledge." 7 As for Texas civil cases, the weight of
authority appears to support their position.44 Both Judge Phillips and
Judge Dally offered valid solutions for the problem. Judge Phillips would
require the State to introduce into evidence the transcription of the court
reporter's notes of the prior proceeding, which would afford a probationer
an opportunity to rebut and would also, of course, take care of the need for
an appellate record in case of an appeal.449 Judge Dally suggested that
"[w]hen a pending motion to revoke probation alleges as a ground for rev-
441. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 8(a) (Vernon 1979).
442. 557 S.W.2d at 105.
443. 411 U.S. at 781-82 (emphasis added).
444. 564 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
445. Id at 732.
446. Id at 733.
447. Id at 733, 740.
448. See Continental Oil Co. v. P.P.G. Indus., 504 S.W.2d 616, 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
449. 564 S.W.2d at 740-41.
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ocation an offense . .. alleged in an indictment, the court should an-
nounce prior to trial on the indictment that it will at the same time
consider that evidence . . . in the motion to revoke. 45°
Probation Revocation-Proof of Convictionfor a Crime Committed During
the Probation Period. Proof of a conviction for a crime committed by a
probationer during the period of his probation is sufficient to support revo-
cation of the probation, provided that the conviction is final, that is, the
conviction must not be on appeal at the time.451 In a case where a hearing
on a revocation motion is held concurrently with a trial before the court
for the crime made the basis of the motion to revoke, and the defendant
pleads guilty to the crime, the resulting criminal conviction will support
the court's subsequent but same day revocation of probation based upon
that conviction, even if the conviction is subsequently appealed.452
The case of Haile v. State453 evoked an unusual application of.the two
rules set out above. A jury found Haile guilty of a crime that was commit-
ted while Haile was on probation, and he immediately gave notice of ap-
peal. The day after defendant's conviction, a hearing was held on the
State's motion to revoke probation, with the same attorneys appearing
before the same judge. In the revocation proceeding, the State offered
proof of Haile's conviction entered the day before. On this showing, the
trial court revoked the defendant's probation. The revocation order made
on the basis of a conviction being appealed was also appealed by defend-
ant.
Both cases were taken to the court of criminal appeals where the court
first affirmed the criminal conviction and then affirmed the probation revo-
cation, explaining that while an appealed conviction cannot be used to
support revocation, once the conviction was affirmed it became a final con-
viction ab initio and rendered nonexistent the defendant's contention of
insufficient evidence in the probation revocation case.454
Probation Revocation Hearing-Collateral Attack on Conviction Upon
Which the Probation is Based It is well established that in a probation
revocation hearing the probationer cannot defend against revocation by
collaterally attacking the conviction upon which his probation was
based,455 except where the contention is that the original conviction is
void rather than voidable.456 The court had occasion to apply this rule in
Wolfe v. State.457 In Wolfe the defendant committed another crime while
on probation. Upon pleading true to the State's motion to revoke, the trial
court revoked probation and sentenced defendant to five years.
450. Id at 733.
451. Barrientez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
452. Bailey v. State, 543 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
453. 556 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Crim App. 1977).
454. Id at 820.
455. Owens v. State, 540 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
456. Exparte Moffett, 542 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
457. 560 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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On appeal, defendant attacked the revocation by contending that the
conviction on which his probation had been based was void. If the appel-
late record brought up by defendant had on its face demonstrated this con-
tention, then the probation revocation would have been set aside, but such
was not the case. Although the record indicated that the original offense
was committed after the return of the indictment, the record did not in-
clude a transcript of the court reporter's notes from the original trial.
Without the transcription the court was unable to ascertain whether other
evidence was introduced to support the conviction.458 Thus, defendant's
collateral attack failed.
Revocation of Probation as a Consequence of Probation Violation. Trial
courts may, at their discretion, continue a defendant's probation despite
revocation hearing evidence to the contrary. Due process, moreover, pro-
hibits revocation of probation as an automatic consequence of a subse-
quent probation violation charge. In Traylor v. State459 a panel of the
court of criminal appeals reminded trial courts of this rule despite failing
to apply it. Traylor had been placed on probation after pleading guilty to
burglary. On May 11, 1976, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
State's motion to revoke probation because the defendant admitted strik-
ing a man with his fist. The court did not rule, but rather took the matter
under advisement. 60 Six months later in November 1976, defendant was
arrested and charged with possession of heroin, and the State filed another
motion to revoke probation. In January 1977 the trial court, with knowl-
edge that defendant had been arrested on the heroin charge but without a
hearing on that charge, entered a revocation order on the original revoca-
tion motion made in May of 1976.46
The court of criminal appeals upheld the action of the trial court, stating
that even though "the trial court had knowledge of a new offense, there is
no showing that the court used such as the basis for revocation. 462 To
reach this conclusion, the court panel had to close its collective eyes to
reality. Either intentionally or inadvertently, the trial court in fact denied
Traylor's due process right to a hearing on the State's motion to revoke
based on the heroin possession charge. There is precious little due process
protection afforded by the rule if it can be circumvented by so simple an
expedient as a ruling indefinitely held in abeyance.
Probation Without an Adjudication of Guilt. Article 42.12, section 3d(a) 463
of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants a trial court discretion to set a
probation term without entering an adjudication of guilt. In light of
Walker v. State,464 however, if the trial court elects to do this, the proba-
458. Id at 688.
459. 561 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
460. Id at 493.
461. Id
462. Id at 494.
463. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3d(a) (Vernon 1979).
464. 557 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
[Vol. 33
CRIMINAL PROCED URE
tioner would be wise to insist on a final adjudication within thirty days of
his guilty plea as provided in article 42.12, section 3d(a).
In Walker the defendant pled guilty to a burglary charge and the trial
court entered an order deferring further proceedings and placing defend-
ant on probation for eight years. Four months later the State filed a mo-
tion asking the trial court to proceed with an adjudication of guilt based
upon alleged violations of probation conditions. At the hearing, defendant
pled true and the trial court thereupon convicted him of the original
charge of burglary and set punishment at eleven years, after first setting
aside its prior orders deferring an adjudication of guilt and setting an
eight-year probation period.
Defendant asserted on appeal that, under the holding of North Carolina
v. Pearce,465 he was denied due process when his punishment was as-
sessed at eleven years instead of eight. The court rejected this contention
for two reasons. First, Pearce is only applicable when a heavier sentence is
imposed by the court upon a reconvicted defendant who has successfully
challenged his first conviction either by appeal or collateral attack. In the
instant case the defendant was never reconvicted since he was found guilty
and assessed punishment only once.466 Further, even if Pearce was con-
strued to be applicable here, it permits an increase in punishment where,
as here, it affirmatively appears from the record that there is identifiable
conduct on the part of the defendant occuring after the time defendant was
originally placed on probation justifying the increased penalty.4 67
Section 7 of article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure468 seems to
provide the same basic benefits to a successful probationer who has been
convicted and assessed punishment as section 3d(c) provides to a success-
ful probationer who receives probation without having been adjudicated
guilty and having his punishment assessed. The Walker holding, there-
fore, dictates that a probationer should always avoid serving a section 3d
probation.
Among the issues left unanswered by Walker is the effect of a plea bar-
gain on a probationer. It is unclear whether the trial court could have
done what it did in Walker if the eight-year probation had resulted from a
plea bargain under article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.469
D. Habeas Corpus
Federal Habeas Corpus Relief In the "New Stone Age" without federal
habeas corpus relief for fourth amendment violations, state court rulings
are starting to diverge from lower federal court rulings. In Stone v. Pow-
el"7 ° the United States Supreme Court held that "where the State has pro-
vided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
465. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
466. 557 S.W.2d at 786.
467. Id
468. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 7 (Vernon 1979).
469. Id. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
470. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief."4 7
The majority in Stone explained this federal habeas preclusion with the
observation that "[diespite differences in institutional environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a
general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial
and appellate courts of the several States." '472 There are indications, how-
ever, that what the Stone majority was "unwilling to assume" is nonethe-
less a fact.
For example, the Supreme Court of Arizona was quick to reassert the
validity of its "murder scene" exception to the search warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment, once there was "New Stone Age 4 73 protection
against the Ninth Circuit's prior specific rejection of that exception. 74
Only the writ of certiorari intervention of the United States Supreme
Court in Mincey v. Arizona475 prevented Arizona's reinstatement of the
"murder scene" exception over the rejection of the Ninth Circuit. The
Supreme Court, however, is in no position to assume the habeas corpus
supervision of the fourth amendment formerly performed by the lower
federal courts.
As Mr. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Mincey points out,
Stone has presented the Supreme Court with the Hobson's choice in cases
of less than national significance, "either to deny certiorari and thereby let
stand divergent state and federal decisions with regard to Fourth Amend-
ment rights; or to grant certiorari and thereby add to our calendar, which
many believe is already overcrowded, cases that might better have been
resolved elsewhere. 476
"New Stone Age" divergence is also taking place between Texas and
Fifth Circuit decisions regarding fourth amendment rights. At least three
Texas cases have held, without any articulated reason, that where law en-
forcement officers secured a search warrant based in part on their sworn
affidavit professing to have seen "known narcotics users" at defendant's
residence, the officers were not required to reveal the identity of the
"known narcotics users" to defendant.477
In Curry v. Estelle478 the Fifth Circuit rejected the Texas courts' position
and affirmed the federal district court's grant of habeas corpus relief. In
O'Quinn v. Estelle,47 9 however, a post-Stone habeas corpus case presenting
471. Id at 494 (footnote omitted).
472. Id at 494 n.35.
473. This is the term used by Circuit Judge Goldberg in his dissenting opinion in
O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1219 (5th Cir. 1977).
474. Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1972).
475. 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978). A discussion of this decision can be found in
text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
476. 98 S. Ct. at 2420, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 308 (Marshall, J., concurring).
477. Phenix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Curry v. State, 459 S.W.2d
644 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Bosley v. State, 414 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 876 (1967).
478. 531 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1976).
479. 574 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978).
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facts substantially identical to Curry, the Fifth Circuit rejected habeas
corpus relief, which in the absence of Stone it would have granted. Be-
cause of Stone, Texas courts are free to continue on a fourth amendment
path divergent from that of the Fifth Circuit, with only the remote possi-
bility of a writ of certiorari road block. The longer the "New Stone Age"
is permitted to continue, the greater will be the gulf between state and
federal decisions regarding the fourth amendment.
United States Supreme Court Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus Juris-
diction. In Wainwright v. Sykes480 the United States Supreme Court con-
tinued its curtailment of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction by rejecting the
deliberate bypass standard announced in Fay v. Noia48'" in favor of a
"cause" and "prejudice" test.
Most jurisdictions,482 including Texas,483 have contemporaneous objec-
tion rules providing that failure to object to the admission of evidence at
the time it is offered waives any error. Until Sykes was handed down,
federal habeas corpus relief was available to vindicate federal constitu-
tional rights of a defendant despite noncompliance with the contempora-
neous objection rule, unless defendant or his attorney "understandingly
and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal
claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical or any other rea-
sons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state pro-
cedures. 484
Under Sykes, however, failure to make timely objection in state court
precludes the opportunity to obtain federal habeas relief, no matter how
meritorious the federal constitutional claim, unless defendant makes an
adequate showing of cause for the noncompliance with the state contem-
poraneous objection rule and some showing of actual prejudice.485 In
Sykes the defendant was denied federal habeas relief because the record
demonstrated the absence of prejudice; thus the majority did not reach the
question of what would constitute adequate cause.
In dissent Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that "any realistic system of
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction must be premised on the reality that the
ordinary procedural default is born of the inadvertence, negligence, inex-
perience, or incompetence of trial counsel. 48 6 He felt that it would be
unjust to the habeas corpus applicant to close the federal courthouse door
as a result of his lawyer's unintentional errors.4 87 If the Sykes majority
480. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
481. 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963). The Court in Fay held that "the federal habeas judge
may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly
procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies." Id at
438.
482. 5 AM. JuR. 2d Appeal and Error § 553 n.13 (1962).
483. Cortez v. State, 520 S.W.2d 764, 765-66 (Tex. Cnm App. 1975); Weatherspoon v.
State, 501 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
484. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
485. 433 U.S. at 84-87.
486. Id at 104.
487. Id at 113.
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does intend the requirement for "adequate cause" to be interpreted in this
manner then, as Justice Brennan says, it is indeed time to stop indulging
the "comfortable fiction that all lawyers are skilled or even competent
craftsmen in representing the fundamental rights of their clients," '488 and
to allow federal collateral review of inadequacy of counsel in such situa-
tions. A trial counsel certainly cannot procedurally waive his own inade-
quacy.
The issue of what constitutes "cause" under the new Sykes rule is pres-
ently before a Texas federal district court in McDonald v. Estelle.489 In
McDonald the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of federal
habeas corpus relief from a Texas sodomy conviction because of the
State's use of a prior uncounseled conviction against the defendant at the
punishment stage of his bifurcated trial.49° The United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded McDonald for further consid-
eration in light of Sykes.4 9 ' On remand the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant, having already established prejudice, must demonstrate cause
for not complying with the contemporaneous rule or be barred from fed-
eral habeas corpus relief.492 Thus, the case was remanded to the district
court for that determination. It will be interesting to see if the federal dis-
trict court and the Fifth Circuit interpret Sykes to be a rejection of unin-
tentional errors or negligence of a defense attorney as adequate cause. The
alternative sixth amendment contention of inadequacy of counsel, sug-
gested by Justice Brennan,493 should be asserted as a hedge against such an
eventuality.
Habeas Corpus Attack on Final Misdemeanor Convictions. Exparte John-
son494 demonstrates again the undue complexity of a habeas corpus attack
on a final misdemeanor conviction. Defendant sought relief from two mis-
demeanor convictions, one for driving while intoxicated and the other for
unlawfully carrying a weapon. His punishment was assessed at sixty days
for each conviction, and he sought habeas corpus relief on the grounds that
he was denied right to counsel and that his guilty pleas were involuntary
and improperly induced by the prosecutor. 495 The judge of the county
court in which defendant had been convicted refused to issue a writ and
refused to hold a hearing on the issues raised by the writ. Defendant ap-
pealed, but the court dismissed the appeal, stating that no appeal would lie
where, as here, the trial court denies rather than issues the writ and then
488. Id at 118.
489. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination of cause by 564
F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
490. McDonald v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1976),yjudgment vacated and remanded,
433 U.S. 904 (1977).
491. 433 U.S. at 904.
492. 564 F.2d at 200.
493. 433 U.S. at 118.
494. 561 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
495. Id at 841.
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denies the relief requested.496 The court stated that the petitioner's remedy
was to present his application before another trial judge.497
The court dismissed the appeal in Exparte Johnson; although the court
of criminal appeals has original jurisdiction over all habeas corpus pro-
ceedings,4 98 it has elected to exercise that jurisdiction only with habeas
corpus attacks on felony convictions.49 9 This is understandable since it is
preferable that initial consideration be made by the original trial court
where possible, 5" or by some other trial court where not.5"'
Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why a petitioner who has prop-
erly sought but been denied issuance of a writ by an appropriate trial court
must continue to search for a trial court that will issue the writ before
denying relief. Surely the court should exercise its original jurisdiction; an
unconstitutional restraint of a citizen's liberty is no less significant because
it stems from a misdemeanor rather than a felony conviction.
The legislature has created a much less cumbersome procedure for
habeas corpus attack on final felony convictions.5"' Since the court of
criminal appeals does not seem to be of a mind to help, the legislature
should at least make substantially the same procedure applicable to habeas
corpus attacks on misdemeanor convictions.
Restraint of Liberty-Prerequisite to Invocation of Habeas Corpus Re-
lief. In Basaldua v. State5"3 the defendant sought habeas corpus relief
from a probation condition that required him to submit his person, place
of residence, and vehicle to search and seizure at any time of day or night,
with or without search warrant, whenever requested to do so by a proba-
tion officer or any other law enforcement officer. The court concluded that
imposition of conditions of probation that unconstitutionally infringed on
freedom of action constitute a "restraint" 5°4 within the scope of habeas
corpus relief.50
5
Lest defense attorneys be misled by Basaldua, Judge Odom wrote a con-
curring opinion to remind that habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal.
He pointed out that the defendant in Basaldua was excused from appeal-
ing at the time the probation condition was imposed because at that time
the court had not handed down its decision declaring such a condition
unreasonable and unenforceable, and defendant should not be faulted for
failing to anticipate such a decision.
50 6
496. Id at 842.
497. Id
498. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.05 (Vernon 1977).
499. Exparte Phelper, 433 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
500. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.09 (Vernon 1977).
501. See note 498 supra.
502. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
503. 558 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
504. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.23 (Vernon 1977).
505. 558 S.W.2d at 5.




Juvenile Court Judge's Duty to Explain Child's Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination. The Texas Family Code requires the juvenile court judge, at
the beginning of the adjudication hearing, to explain to the child and his
parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem the child's privilege against self-
incrimination." 7 In In re N. SD.5 °8 the State argued that the child had
been adequately informed of his right against self-incrimination because
the child and his attorney signed a printed form that set out the privilege
and that also contained the following sentence: " 'In the event that any
portion of these Instructions and Explanations are not fully understood, do
not hesitate to call on the bailiff or the secretary of this Court for further
instructions.' "509 The court of criminal appeals rejected the State's argu-
ment, finding that the trial court did not explain to the child his privilege
against self-incrimination. A juvenile court judge cannot delegate his duty
to explain this right to the child. The juvenile court's delinquency finding,
therefore, was reversed, and the case was remanded for another hearing.
Summary Judgment Procedure Applicability to Juvenile Case Proceed-
ings. In State v. L.JB. ' the State charged the juvenile for engaging in
delinquent conduct by committing theft. The juvenile filed a motion for
summary judgment5 " supported by his sworn affidavit. The State did not
respond and the juvenile court dismissed the State's petition with
prejudice.
Upon the State's appeal, the court of civil appeals reversed and re-
manded the case for hearing. The appellate court rejected the summary
judgment procedure as inapplicable because the issue of whether a juve-
nile has engaged in delinquent conduct and consequently is in need of
supervision or rehabilitation cannot be adequately determined by affida-
vits. Rather, an evidentiary hearing with witnesses present is necessary so
that all parties, including the juvenile court, can ascertain the best interests
of the juvenile.5t2
Service of Summons. The Texas Family Code"1 3 codifies the common
law rule that a minor child is without legal capacity to waive service of
process.5 14 Consequently, before a juvenile court can have jurisdiction
over a juvenile in either a delinquency proceeding or a proceeding to cer-
tify a juvenile as an adult for criminal prosecution, the juvenile must actu-
ally be served with a summons.5 15 In Grayless v. State5t 6 the State filed a
507. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(b)(3) (Vernon 1975).
508. 555 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
509. Id
510. 561 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
511. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A.
512. 561 S.W.2d at 549.
513. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.06(e) (Vernon 1975).
514. In re W.L.C., 562 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1978).




delinquency petition and the juvenile was served with a summons. Subse-
quently the State filed a petition to certify the juvenile as an adult for crim-
inal prosecution, but no summons was ever issued on the latter petition.
At the hearing on the petition to certify the juvenile as an adult, the juve-
nile, his parents, and retained counsel were present, but did not object to
the lack of service. The juvenile was thereafter tried for murder as an
adult, convicted, and received a twenty-five year sentence.-" 7
On appeal the court of criminal appeals reversed and remanded the case
because the juvenile court never had jurisdiction over the juvenile in the
adult certification hearing. Summons was never served in this proceeding
and since a juvenile cannot waive service of summons,.1 8 the appearance
of the juvenile at the certification hearing and his failure to object to the
lack of a proper summons could not constitute a waiver of the service of
summons. 5 1 9 Because the juvenile court never had jurisdiction in the certi-
fication proceeding, its order waiving juvenile court jurisdiction and certi-
fying the juvenile for criminal prosecution was a nullity.5 20
Psychiatriac Examination. A psychiatric examination is provided by statute
to assist in determining whether a juvenile alleged to have engaged in de-
linquent conduct is responsible for his acts.52' According to In re
K WE 522 this section "is not referable to a discretionary transfer proceed-
ing which is concerned with adult responsibility for criminal activity. 523
Once a juvenile is certified as an adult for criminal prosecution, however,
he is entitled to all the protection offered by the sanity and competency
provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.5 24
Appeal of Juvenile Court Order Transferring a Juvenile to Criminal Court for
Prosecution as an Adult. The holding in L.L.S. v. Wade52 points up a
weakness in the Texas Family Code that should be corrected by the legis-
lature. Section 56.01(c)(1) 526 permits a juvenile to appeal a juvenile court
order transferring the juvenile to a criminal court for trial as an adult. The
criminal court to which the juvenile is transferred may proceed, however,
even though the appeal is pending. In Wade the juvenile appealed the
juvenile court's order transferring him for trial as an adult and then ap-
plied to the court of civil appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent the
criminal trial court from proceeding until the interlocutory appeal was de-
cided. The writ was refused by the court of civil appeals because there was
no threat to that court's jurisdiction; that is, should the appeals court later
517. Id. at 219.
518. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.06(e) (Vernon 1975).
519. 567 S.W.2d at 219-20.
520. Id at 220.
521. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.05(b) (Vernon 1975).
522. 556 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
523. Id at 627.
524. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46.02, .03 (Vernon 1979).
525. 565 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
526. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(c)(1) (Vernon 1975).
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reverse the transfer order of the juvenile court, any conviction in the crimi-
nal court would be vacated.527
Even though such an eventuality may not often occur, the Family Code
should be amended so as to prevent such an absurd result. A juvenile
should not run the gauntlet of a criminal trial so long as a possibility re-
mains that such a trial might become a nullity. The code should be
amended to provide that a juvenile's transfer be suspended pending the
outcome of the appeal. Moreover, the appeal should be given preference
in order to prevent undue delay in making final disposition of the juve-
nile's case either in juvenile court or in criminal court, depending on the
outcome of the appeal.
Right of Juvenile Transferred for Trial as an Adult to an Examining
Trial. Despite mandatory statutory language,528 it has long been held
that the right to an examining trial is rendered moot and thus terminated
by the return of an indictment.529 This is not true, however, for a juvenile
who has been transferred from juvenile court to criminal district court for
trial as an adult.53° An examining trial is mandatory for a transferred ju-
venile because of the Family Code, which provides that an "examining
trial shall be conducted by the court to which the case was transferred,
which may remand the child to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court."5 3
A transferred juvenile thus has a right that regular adults do not have.
"It is a valuable right, for it furnishes another opportunity to have the
criminal proceedings against the juvenile terminated and the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court resumed."532 For this reason the court of criminal
appeals in Menefee v. State53 3 voided an indictment of a transferred juve-
nile for murder because the trial court failed to conduct an examining trial.
It should be noted that according to Criss v. State534 the juvenile and his
attorney can waive the examining trial if the waiver is in writing and
otherwise conforms to the requirements of Family Code section
51.09(a).135
527. 565 S.W.2d at 252.
528. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 16.01 (Vernon 1977).
529. Bullard v. State, 533 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
530. Menefee v. State, 561 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
531. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(h) (Vernon 1975).
532. 561 S.W.2d at 829.
533. 561 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
534. 563 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
535. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.09(a) (Vernon 1975).
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